From: bill payne <billp@nmol.com>
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 1998 18:18:56 -0800 (PST)
To: wire@monkey-boy.com
Subject: sick feeling
Message-ID: <34FA16FB.3668@nmol.com>
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Subject: 
        Halabja, Iraq and what you wrote
  Date: 
        Sun, 01 Mar 1998 18:58:39 -0700
  From: 
        bill payne <billp@nmol.com>
    To: 
        L E Banderet <lbanderet@natick-ccmail.army.mil>


Sunday 3/1/98 6:33 PM

Lou

Got your stuff on Saturday.

Patty and I both commented on the picture of your 
lovely new wife.

And I was  pleased that you had authored or co-authored
85 publications. 

This is what I was supposed to train you for.

Patty and I watched 60 Minutes tonight and what happened in 
Halabja, Iraq.  

The IMMEDIATE and LONG TERM effects of a combination 
mustard and sarin gas attack on genetics.

Last night I transcribed some of your and you co-authors' words.

Volume 9, Number 4, 1997

  MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY

  The Official Journal of the 
  Division of Military Psychology
  American Psychological Association

  Special Issue:  Effects of Chemical Protective
                  Clothing of Military Performance
  Guest Editors:  Gerald P. Krueger and
                  Louis E. Banderet

         Psychological Aspects of Chemical Defense and Warfare

        James W. Stokes
        U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School
        Fort Sam Houston, Texas

        Louis E. Banderet
        U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine
        Natick, Massachusetts

  Concerns about chemical, biological, or radiation (CBR) weapons  and 
  their potential for warfare can be very stressful.  Such concerns
  subject  people to unfamiliar threats in highly ambiguous situations,
in which 
  people feel they may be wronged or they are helpless.  Maladaptive
  psychological overreactions or underreactions may result.  Such
  reactions to chemical warfare are illustrated with the experience from
World War
  I,  the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the 1995 terrorist attack in the
Tokyo
  subway.  General principles of psychology suggest strategies and
  tactics for training and materiel development that should enhance
military
  performance and reduce maladaptive stress in CBR threat situations. 
Some of these
  practices  may be relevant to nonmilitary law enforcement and relief
agencies
  that manage CBR threats.

page 395.

Now I transcribe some of the more relevant stuff.

  Effects of Chemical Protective Clothing on Military Performance:

  A Review of the Issues

  Gerald P. Krueger
  Star Mountain, Inc.
  Alexandria, Virginia

  Lous E. Banderet
  U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine
  Natick, Massachusetts
        
  This review in this special issue of Military Psychology on the
  effects of chemical protective clothing (CPC) on military performance
provide a historical
  perspective on continued anxieties over likely use of battlefield
  chemical-biological weapons and summarizes significant concerns of
military personnel weaning CPC in
  training and combat.  This review describes pschophysiological
stresses such
  protective ensembles have on personnel and how these affect military
performance, and it
  summarizes major military psychological research program on the effect
of wearing CPC. 
  This article reviews what is known about wearing CPC, describes future
CPC
  developments, and  identifies domains for improved military training
with CPC.

              MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT 
              OF C-B WEAPONS

  There are many medical, physiological and psychological reactions from
  exposure to chemical-biological (C-B) weapons.  Many bio-warfare
agents and most
  chemical weapons are designed to interfere with function of the
nervous system and to
  disrupt normal control of vital organ systems that sustain life.  For
example,  the more
  common chemical war nerve agents involve organophosphate compounds, 
similar to
  insecticides, that inhibit  cholinesterase enzymes throughout the
body.  Because cholinesterase
  hydrolyzes acetylcholine where ever liberated, this inhibition 
results in
  excessive concentrations of acetylcholine at various sites - from the
ending of the
  parasympathetic nerves to smooth muscles of the iris, ciliary body,
bronchi, gastrointestinal trace,
  bladder, and blood  vessels; to secretary gland of the respiratory
tract' and to endings of the
  sympathetic nerves to sweat glands (Newhouse, 1987; Simmons et at
1989).  Exposure to large
  amounts of nerve agent may lead to loss of muscle control, twitching,
paralysis,
  unconsciousness, convulsions, coma, and even death.  The most common
cause of death after acute
  exposure is respiratory arrest.  Death may occur within minutes or
take several hours.
     In terms of psychological functioning, moderate but nonlethal
  exposure to nerve agent produces severe impairment in cognition,
vigilance, memory and
  language.  Acute intoxication produces confusion, drowsiness, and
difficulty in
  concentration (Newhouse, 1987).  These impairment make it difficult to
continue to perform may
  soldier tasks. Effects on cognition may persist after only a slight
exposure. 
  Performance improvement appears to correlate with the body's
regeneration of
  acetycholinesterase, usually requiring several months.
    Neurophysychological testing (Newhouse, 1987) reveals that chronic
  exposure to  organophosphates significantly impairs higher mental
function
  requiring use of the frontal lobes, particularly the left lobe. 
Organophosphate poisoning
  selectively  impairs memory of recently learned information, and this
impairment is likely related to
  cholinergic involvement in the memory processes.  The effects include
defects in long-term
  memory, visual searching, and response alteration - effects similar to
those caused by a frontal
  lobotomy.  In chronically exposed individuals, speed of task
performance and overall cognitive
  efficiency also declines. Persistent visual impairments are reported
in workers poisoned with
  anticholinesterase insecticides, and acute poisoning impair oculomotor
function. 
  Poisoning with nerve agents may also cause psychiatric disturbances
such as depression.
    Use of C-B weapons results not only in large number of physical
  casualties on the battlefield by in may psychological casualties as
well.  Concern over the mere
  threat that C-B weapons might be used raises battlefield anxiety of
combatants and can produce
  a level of fear disproportionate to that evoked by countless
alternative conventional
  battlefield means of killing or maiming, such a with guns, artillery,
and bombs.  Such
  anxieties can create large numbers of psychological stress casualties
contribution to unit
  ineffectiveness on the battlefield and combat losses.  Such adverse
emotions may also cause posttraumatic
  stress disorders after combat ceases.
                
                DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERMEASURES
                FOR THE COMBAT THEATER

   Modern military forces recognize the C-B weapons can be the
  attention-getting equivalent of a poor country's nuclear weapons. 
Such weapons can be
  counter-acted, however, and concerned nations prepare their forces to
preserve their health and
  safety against C-B warfare.   ...

                        THE THREAT OF C-B WARFARE

  Although biological warfare was used centuries ago by the Romans and
  was used in the 14th century by the Tartars, who catapulted
plague-infected bodies
  into cities under siege (Hewish, 1997),  military forces have made
scant use of
  biological warfare in modern times.  The more recent innovation of
chemical warfare dates to 1914
  when the French used tear gas against unprotected German forces, who
in turn introduced
  chlorine and phosgene in 1915 and mustard gas in 1917 against the
British, who sustained
  14,000 casualties in 3 months (Hewish, 1997).  May World Ware I
soldiers were grotesquely
  injured or died in gas war trenches in France and Russia;  Russia's
gas casualties exceed a
  half million, including 50,000 fatalities (Westerhoff, 1980).
    In 1925, many countries signed a Geneva Protocol prohibiting first
  use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.  However, during the
1930s, several
  countries, notably Germany, encouraged chemists to develop chemical
weapons as a by-product of
  insecticide research production.  By World War II, Germany and powers
stockpiled huge
  caches of chemical, but probably due to fear of in-kind retaliation,
chemical weapons were not
  used in World War II.
    After the war, Germany's organophoshporous arsenal fell into Russian
  hands, and for the next 50 years, military forces relegated C-B
warfare efforts to relatively
  quiet development programs for future battlefields.
    Since World War II, C-B weapons have been employed several times on
  a relatively small scale.  In the 1970s, the Vietnamese used chemical
and "yellow rain"
  biological agents in Cambodian jungles, the Soviets used chemical in
Afghanistan (U.S.
  Department of State, 1980), Iraq used sulfur mustard  and other
chemical in the Iran-Iraq
  conflict (1979-1980), and Iraq used chemical in 1980 - this time
against its own people, the
  northern Kurds (Stuteville, 1997).
    There have been periodic threats to use chemical weapons on a grand
  scale.  In the 1970s, the Warsaw Pact possessed huge stockpiles of
chemical weapons (
  mostly soman, cyanide, and mustard gas), and Soviet chemical warfare
teams openly
  conducted extensive training in gas warfare tactics.  Such readiness
for large scale C-B
  warfare was underscored in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, as Iraq
threatened to use chemical
  (sarin) and biologicals (anthrax spores) against coalition forces and
possibly against
  neighboring cities in Saudi Arabia and Israel (Begley, Barry,  &
Hager, 1991).  By January 1991,
  Saudi Arabia had predug 50,000 graves planned for burying civilian
(noncombat)
  casualties expected to succumb to Iraqi chemical poisoning from
anticipated rocket attacks on
  Saudi cities oraerosols drifting from the battlefields (Kaplan, 1991).
    Although Iraq did not unleash such chemical, and the battles were
  ultimately short, many U.S. military personnel may been exposed to
chemical during the
  March 1991 destruction of Iraqi weapon stockpiled (mostly sarin) near
Khamisiyah,
  Iraq (Stuteville, 1997).  The U. S. government continue to investigate
whether exposures
  to chemical agents may have contributed to the so-called Gulf War
illnesses
  experienced by many U.S. military veterans of that encounter. 
Exposure of soldiers to
  multiple chemical and and environmental stressors may be linked to
psychophysiological
  illnesses that manifest in symptomatology such as disabling fatigue,
insomnia, malaise, joint
  and muscle pains, skin sores, hair loss, and gastrointestinal and
respiratory
  difficulties (Brown & Priest, 1996).  Others asset that U.S. military
personnel were exposed
  to Iraq chemical warfare from Scud missiles, artillery and aircraft
(Stuteville, 1997)

                        PUBLIC CONCERN

  Open, frank, public news of existent military chemical stockpiles,
  proliferation of chemical or biological weaponry, and periodic
'saber-ratting' threats to use
  such weapons amplify world public concerns over the enormity of what
someday could be a horrific
  chemical or biological calamity.  Unprotected civilian populations
fear they may be
  deliberately attacked by chemical and biological weapons or
inadvertently by aerosol warfare
  agents drifting into populated areas of a battlefield.  Disastrous
incident like the one in
  1984 at a chemical actory in Bhopal, India, which killed over 2,000
people and sickened  
  countless others, sensitized citizenry to the lethal potential of such
chemical
  compounds.  In 1995, terrorist attacks on the Tokyo subway, and news
media discussion of possible use
  of nerve agents in terrorist disruption of public gathering like the
1992 and 1996
  Olympics, heightened Public fears over such chemical incidents have
become almost visceral.  News
  of recent advances in genetic technologies (Dando, 1997)  suggest use
of future
  biological weapons with unprecedented insidiousness and specificity is
possible.  Moreover,
  the mass media and media expert sources remind the public that the
United States  may not be
  adequately prepared or trained to defend itself against chemical or
biological warfare (Beal,
  1997).  ...

I got a sick feeling when Hans Buehler phoned from Zurich on why he was
jailed in the Evin prison in Tehran.

You failed to mention the long-term effects of mustard-sarin.  

Or how the suits were to protect against biological weapons.

I have an even more sick feeling now.  

bill

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