From: nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Fri, 24 Apr 1998 02:39:08 -0700 (PDT)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Traceability of Calling Cards, Phones, Remailers
Message-ID: <199804240939.LAA03555@basement.replay.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May wrote:
> At 12:27 PM -0800 4/23/98, Anonymous wrote:
> >Keep in mind that Timothy McVeigh thought he had anonymity with his
> >use of a prepaid 'anonymous' phone card over public payphones. He was
> >wrong. 

> If I recall correctly, they determined that the same calling card was used
> to call various places. Once they had identified the card, correlation was
> easy.

It is even easier to track in real-time if one has prior information
in regard to the possessession of such 'anonymous' instruments, either
through in-place informants on either end (or both ends) of the
transaction.

> What I took from this was the advisability of buying a dozen or so cheap
> prepaid cards, from a machine dispenser or shrinkwrap/cardpack untraceable
> sale, and then not use any single card over and over again.

  Mr. May is astute enough to recognize that law enforcement agencies
are fully capable of reading (or writing) the same guerrila-outlaw
how-to books and manuals available to would-be anonymous activists, and
that it is dangerous for an individual to fail to use their own wit
and wisdom to add additional layers of protection and deception to
guerilla methods commonly championed.
  e.g. - a 'known plaintext' becomes one-step deeper when translated
into an unfamiliar language.

> >It is highly unlikely that electronically-based 'anonymous' technology
> >is going to be any more untracable than meatspace-disseminated tools
> >of anonymity.
 
> With all due respect, I think you're talking out of your ass on this one.

  One should be careful about insulting people named 'Anonymous', since
we come from such a large family...

> The math of tracing messages routed through a network of N selected
> remailers each properly executing a remailer protocol (e.g., accumulating M
> messages, encryption at each stage, etc.) is far, far stronger than
> anything McVeigh was using.

  Very true, but I was thinking more in terms of the pre-existing
compromise of the tools of anonymity which will be offered/marketed
to the masses.
  e.g. - Decades ago, after picking up a book order from Loompmatics
which I had sent to a cold-address (USPS), I shortly thereafter watched
in amusement as border-guards tore my vehicle apart looking for material
that they theoretically were not supposed to know I had taken possession
of, not knowing that my 'unreasonable' paranoia had resulted in my 
making a 'test run' before crossing the border with them.

 > I had hoped there would be many more remailers in use by the time the
next
> Big Event happened and involved remailers, but it appears remailers are
> spreading slowly and the pressure cooker is reaching the bursting point for
> more patriot or militia or terrorist actions.

  There are many more remailers in existence than is readily apparent.
The Winsock remailer software, for instance, has been modified to
allow 'clustered' remailers to exist on a single server, wherein a
number of individuals can channel their email to a separate in-house
remailer designed to give them an outgoing consistent persona that
is not traceable to their incoming message through ordinary man-in-
the-middle tracking.

Totoally Anonymous