From: bill payne <billp@nmol.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Jun 1998 10:03:17 -0700 (PDT)
To: jensul@wired.com
Subject: My knowledge of NSA 'deficient' crypto algorithms
Message-ID: <3575813B.4DBE@nmol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Wednesday 6/3/98 10:55 AM

jensul

So as not to misspell J[G]en[n]ifer.

You might be interested to look at the University of Southern
California home page on the gfsr.

My co-author Lewis was one of my former ms and phd students.

NSA's crypto algorithms are okay - for hardware implementation -
but are classified, in my opinion, to possibly hide embarrassment.

Some of us at Sandia offered to help NSA fix its 'deficient' crypto
algorithms.  For money, of course.

It is EASY to make a BLUNDER in crypto.  For theoretical or
implementation reasons.  NSA knows this too.  And is pretty cautious
about what it does.

I partially read another crypto-related article at

http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C22705%2C00.html?st.ne.fd.gif.j

Best
bill

Subject: 
        Marc Dacier
  Date: 
        Wed, 03 Jun 1998 07:34:04 -0600
  From: 
        bill payne <billp@nmol.com>
    To: 
        jy@jya.com
    CC: 
        dac@zurich.ibm.com, kaj@lanl.gov


Wednesday 6/3/98 7:25 AM

John Young

I looked at http://www.zurich.ibm.com/~dac/RAID98

I was in Marc Dacier's (IBM Zurich Research Laboratory, Switzerland)
office last April in Zurich.

Dacier was quizzing me about what the US was concerned about,
secuity-wise, inside weapons systems.  Spiking, of course.

And it was so nice to learn only yesterday that USC has a home page
something I thought-up.

http://www-hto.usc.edu/software/seqaln/doc/html/gfsr.3.html

I SURE UNDERSTOOD the algorithms behind the NSA KG schematics
Brian Snow showed me.

Let's continue to hope for prompt settlement of the unfortunate matter
BEFORE things get WORSE.  

And we can all get onto better and hopefully less destructive,
http://www.aci.net/kalliste/, endeavors.

Later
bill