From: bill payne <billp@nmol.com>
Date: Sat, 4 Jul 1998 12:58:21 -0700 (PDT)
To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk
Subject: NSA , FBI, and Sandia labs - and stolen weapons
Message-ID: <359E887A.6EDB@nmol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

Saturday 7/4/98 1:20 PM

Laszlo Baranyi

I read http://www.qainfo.se/~lb/crypto_ag.htm

I will look in my files for a paper published in the Association
of Computing Machinery authored by G. J. Simmons on the COVERT CHANNEL.  
Then e-mail you an exact reference.

Information FORCED on me by Sandian James Gosler funded by NSA was about
the COVERT CHANNEL.  Similar to what I read at
http://www.aci.net/kalliste/ricono.htm

Gosler made the point to us that the 'black hats' could spike a device,
either through hardware or software.

A 'white hat' group  could not discover how the covert channel worked
[was spiked].

Gosler later wanted to assign me to an NSA project. I refused. I would
not sign the required papers - which effectively makes the signer give
up their civil rights.

See http://www.qainfo.se/~lb/crypto_ag.htm
 
 RIGGING THE GAME" Baltimore Sun, December 10, 1995. This article can be
ordered on-line
 http://www.sunspot.net/archive/search/

for details what NSA requires employees to sign.

Sandia reassigned me to break electronic locks for the FBI.
http://www.fbi.gov/
and http://www.fbi.gov/fo/nyfo/nytwa.htm 

I attach results, which the FBI blieves is SECRET/NSI, on how to
counterfeit Wiegand wire access 
credentials funded by the FBI.

Perhaps the following quotation and reference might be valuable to
you.

             Spy agencies are also dabbling in hacker warfare.  The 
             National Security Agency, along with top-secret
intelligence 
             units in the Army,  Air Force, has been researching 
             ways to infect enemy computer systems with particularly 
             virulent strains of software viruses that already plague
home 
             and office computers.  Another type of virus, the logic
bomb, 
             would remain dormant in an enemy system until a
predetermined 
             time, when it would come to life and begin eating data. 
Such 
             bombs could attack, for example, a nation's air-defense
system 
             or central bank.  The CIA has a clandestine program that 
             would insert booby-trapped computer chips into weapons
systems 
             that a foreign arms manufacturer might ship to a
potentially 
             hostile country - a technique called "chipping".  In
another 
             program, the agency is looking at how independent
contractors 
             hired by arms makers to write software for weapons systems 
             could be bribed to slip in viruses. 
 
             "You get into the arms manufacturer's supply network, 
             take the stuff off-line briefly, insert the bug, the let it
go 
             to the country," explained a CIA source who specializes in 
             information technology.  "When the weapons system goes into
a 
             hostile situation, everything about it seems to work, but
the 
             warhead doesn't explode." 
 
              
             weapons may be even more exotic than computer viruses. 
             Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico has developed
a 
             suitcase-sized device that generates a high-powered 
             electromagnetic pulse.  Commandos could sneak into a
foreign 
             capitol, place the EMP suitcase next to a bank and set it
off. 
             The resulting pulse would burn out all electronic
components 
             in the building. ... 
 
        [TIME, August 21, 1995, by Douglas Waller] 

The US was super-concerned when stinger missiles, AFTER THE US GAVE THEM
TO THE AFGHANIS, that the stingers might be used against the US.  

So the idea is to spike weapons so that the US remains in ELECTRONIC
CONTROL - if physical
control is lost.  

There are, of course, hazards in powering-up a stolen foreign weapon.

My wife Patty [Implementing Basics : How Basics Work William H. and
Patricia Payne / 
Published 1982 http://www.amazon.com]and I were in Zurich in April 
1997.  

I spoke to Hans Buehler on the phone from the airpont.

Buehler gave me ideas on how to get my case settled TOO.

I JUST WANT MY MONEY AND OUT OF THIS MESS! 
http://www.jya.com/sec062998.htm

Best.   And I look forward to reading more about what you discover.
bill

http://www.apcatalog.com/cgi-bin/AP?ISBN=0125475705&LOCATION=US&FORM=FORM2

http://www-hto.usc.edu/software/seqaln/doc/html/gfsr.3.html

Coauthor Lewis in the above is one of my former MS and PhD students in
computer science.

http://www.friction-free-economy.com/


Counterfeiting Wiegand Wire Access Credentials
     
                                   Bill Payne
     
                                 October 16,1996
     
                                    Abstract
     
                  Wiegand wire access credentials are easy and
                  inexpensive to counterfeit.
     
        Access Control & Security Systems Integration magazine, October
        1996 [http://www/securitysolutions.com] published the article,
     
             Wiegand technology stands the test of time
     
             by PAUL J. BODELL, page 12
     
             Many card and reader manufacturers offer Wiegand (pronounced
             wee-gand) output.  However, only three companies in the
             world make Wiegand readers.  Sensor Engineering of Hamden
             Conn., holds the patent for Wiegand, and Sensor has licensed
             Cardkey of Simi Valley, Calif., and Doduco of Pforzheim,
             Germany, to manufacture Wiegand cards and readers. ...  A
             Wiegand output reader is not the same thing as a Wiegand
             reader,  and it is important to understand the differences.
     
                In brief, Wiegand reader use the Wiegand effect to
             translate card information around the patented Wiegand
             effect in which a segment of a specially treated wire
             generates an electronic pulse when subjected to a specific
             magnetic field.  If the pulse is generated when the wire is
             near a pick-up coil, the pulse can be detected by a circuit.
             Lining up several rows of wires and passing them by a cold
             would generate a series of pulses.  Lining up two rows of
             wires - calling on row "zero bits" and the other "one bits"
             - and passing them by two different coils would generate two
             series of pulses, or data bits.  These data bits can then be
             interpreted as binary data and used to control other
             devices.  If you seal the coils in a rugged housing with
             properly placed magnets, and LED and some simple circuitry,
             you have a Wiegand reader.  Carefully laminate the special
             wires in vinyl, and artwork, and hot-stamp a number on the
             vinyl, and you have a Wiegand card.
     
             IN THE BEGINNING
     
               Wiegand was first to introduce to the access control
             market in the late 1970s.  It was immediately successful
             because it filled the need for durable, secure card and
             reader technology.
               Embedded in the cards, Wiegand wires cannot be altered or
             duplicated. ...
     
        Bodell's Last statement is incorrect.
     
        Tasks for EASILY counterfeiting Wiegand wire cards are
     
        1    Locate the wires inside the card to read the 0s and 1s.
     
        2    Build an ACCEPTABLE copy of the card.
     
        Bodell's clear explanation of the working of a Wiegand card can
        be visualized
     
             zero row    |     |   |
     
             one row        |          |
     
             binary      0  1  0   0   1
             representation
     
        Solutions to Task 1
     
             A    X-ray the card
     
             B    MAGNI VIEW FILM,  Mylar film reads magnetic fields ...
                  Edmunds Scientific Company, catalog 16N1, page
                  205, C33,447  $11.75
     
        is placed over the top of the Wiegand card.
     
        COW MAGNET,  Cow magnetics allow farmers to trap metal in the
        stomachs of their cows.  Edmunds, page 204, C31,101 $10.75
        is placed under the card.
     
        Location of the wires is easily seen on the green film.
     
        Mark the position of the wires with a pen.
     
        Next chop the card vertically using a shear into about 80/1000s
        paper-match-sized strips.
     
        Don't worry about cutting a wire or two.
     
        Note that a 0 has the pen mark to the top.  A 1 has the pen mark
        at the bottom.
     
        Take a business card and layout the "paper match"-like strips to
        counterfeit the card number desired.
     
        Don't worry about spacing.  Wiegand output is self-clocking!
     
        Tape the "paper-match - like" strips to the business card.
     
        Only the FUNCTION of the card needs to be reproduced!
     
                                     History
     
        Breaking electronic locks was done as "work for others" at Sandia
     
        National Laboratories beginning in 1992 funded by the Federal
        Bureau of Investigation/Engineering Research Facility, Quantico,
        VA.
     
        The FBI opined that this work was SECRET/NATIONAL SECURITY
        INFORMATION.
     
        Details of the consequences of this work are covered in
     
             Fired Worker File Lawsuit Against Sandia
             Specialist Says He Balked When Lab Sought Electronic
             Picklock Software, Albuquer Journal, Sunday April 25, 1993
     
             State-sanctioned paranoia,  EE Times, January 22, 1996
     
             One man's battle,  EE Times, March 22, 1994
     
             Damn the torpedoes,  EE Times, June 6, 1994
     
             Protecting properly classified info,  EE Times, April 11,
             1994
     
             DOE to scrutinize fairness in old whistle-blower cases,
             Albuquerque Tribune, Nov 7 1995
     
             DOE boss accelerates whistle-blower protection,  Albuquerque
             Tribune, March 27, 1996
     
             DOE doesn't plan to compensate 'old' whistle-blowers with
             money, Albuquerque Tribune September 27, 199