From: bill payne <billp@nmol.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Aug 1998 09:45:03 -0700 (PDT)
To: armoral@flash.net
Subject: dow jones
Message-ID: <35E6DD65.2504@nmol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

Friday 8/28/98 10:07 AM

J Orlin Grabbe

You may have gotten it TOO RIGHT

http://www.aci.net/kalliste/apocalyp.htm

Morales and I met.

We got a response from a deputy clerk to our attached letter.

No form for 54(b) certification and no examples.

We have a plan of what to include in our response to 

  http://www.jya.com/chrysler98.htm

AND 54(b) certification.

We see that we can respond by e-mail.

  e-mail: vhardy@detroit.bozell.com

But we'll use certified snail mail too.

Reporter Spohn of the ABQ Trib  
  
  1990 Lawrence Spohn, Albuquerque Tribune     
http://www.aaas.org/AAAS/awards.html
  http://www.atiin.com/atiin/tribune.htm  
  http://www.abqtrib.com 

told me he is going to make FOIA requests for the invoices NSA spent or
wasted funding public key cryptography chips TOO.

Morales and I also discussed our up-coming NSA fee waiver lawsuit. 

  NSA  deputy director Barbara McNamara's  wrote me a letter dated
19     August  1998.  http://www.nsa.gov:8080/mission.html

  McNamara wrote,

  The key issue I considered in my review is whether disclosure of
the    information is likely to contribute to the public understanding
of the   operations or activities of the government. ...

  This response may be construed as a denial of your appeal.           
Accordingly, you are hereby advised to your right to seek judicial     
review of my decision pursuant to 5 U.S.C.  552(a)(4)
  (B) in the United States District Court in the district in which
you    reside, in which you have your principal place of business, in
which    the Agency's records are situated (U.S. District Court of
Maryland),    or in the District of Columbia. 

We've learned a lot with our current NSA lawsuit.  So the NEXT lawsuit
should be more devastating for the government.

But let's hope we get this UNFORTUNATE matter settled so that we
can move on to other projects.

I miss the economic articles you post from throughout the world.
http://www.aci.net/kalliste/

What's happening is not your fault.  You are merely a message-deliverer.

Later
bill


Tuesday 8/18/98 7:33 AM

Certified   Return receipt requested

Robert M. March, Clerk
United States District Court
Office of the Clerk
POB 2384
US Courthouse
Santa Fe, NM 87504-2384

Dear clerk March:

Purposes of this letter are to

1 request a copy of a UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO Rule 
54(b) certification form if such form exists

2 request an example of a Rule 54(b) certification if such certification is submitted in non-standard form

3 ask for you to provide us with DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO case citations for others required by the Tenth 
circuit to seek Rule 54(b) certification.

We could not find form referenced in 1 in LOCAL CIVIL RULES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO or at  http://www.nmcourt.fed.us/dcdocs/ specifically 
http://www.nmcourt.fed.us/dcdocs/files/lcvrules.txt

We ask that you respond to this letter by September 1, 1998.

Nonresponse must be interpreted as

4  there is no Rule 54(b)form

5  there is no example of a Rule 54(b) non-standard form certification

6  there are no examples of Rule 54(b) certifications in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO.

Sincerely

  
William H. Payne             	   	 Arthur R. Morales
13015 Calle de Sandias NE          	 1024 Los Arboles NW
Albuquerque, NM 87111              	 Albuquerque, NM 87107       
  



Friday February 27, 1998 11:18 AM

By e-mail and US mail

Lieutenant General Kenneth A Minihan, USAF
Director, National Security Agency
National Security Agency
9800 Savage Road
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000

Dear General Minihan:

Purposes of the letter are to

1  request information under the Freedom of Information Act
2  explore settlement possibilities of our current lawsuit.

In about 1986 Sandia National Laboratories assigned me the 
task of  design and construction of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty seismic data authenticator.

In the initial stages of the project, Sandia cryptographer 
Gustavus Simmons attempted to convince both Sandia 
management and NSA employees Tom White, Mark Unkenholtz,
and Ed Georgio that a form of public key authentication should 
replace NSA employee Ronald Benincasa's National Seismic
Station/Unmaned Seismic Observatory 11-bit data authentication
algorithm.

My Sandia supervisor John Holovka and project leader H B [Jim]
Durham ordered me to write a paper explaining public key 
cryptography.

This paper,  RSA ENCRYPTION, along with my SAND report
describing my implementation of Benincasa's algorithm and
filings in our lawsuit, now appear on Internet at
http://www.jya.com/index.htm, click CRYPTOME, then OpEd,
then http://www.jya.com/whprsa.htm.

Sandia explored the merits of switching from Benincasa's
algorithm to a public key-based authentication method suggested
by Simmons.

For Sandia's evaluation of the merits of public key, electronic tagging,
and Bureau of Engraving and Printing projects ,  I bought for Sandia 
samples both the Cylink CY1024 and AT&T A & B two chip sets for
modulo m arithmetic computations.

NSA employee Tom White sent me a copy of the SECRET classified
NSA report on IBM's hardware public key chip FIREFLY.

I wrote in my tutorial paper

  RSA hardware computations

  The slow speed of software RSA computations plus the potential
  wide use prompted several companies to build chips which compute
  modular arithmetic to at least several hundred bits.  Most of
  these chips "cascade" to compute with a larger number of bits.

  Corporations involved in building these chips are

     1  IBM  Firefly

     2  AT&T

     3  Motorola (apparently a three chip set)

     4  Cylink   Pittway-First alert

     5  Sandia Labs (Algorithm M and predecessor chip)

  Details of the IBM chip is classified.  AT&T as of July 1987 has
  not released details of their chip.  Little information is
  available on the Motorola chip set.

  The Cylink chip is commercially available.  Its price dropped
  from $1,500 to $600 each in June 1987.  Data is transferred to
  and from the chip with serial shift register communication.

  The early Sandia chip was limited in speed.  The replacement
  chip is cascadeable, communicates with 8 or 16 bits parallel,
  matches the speed of the Cylink chip, but is not out of
  fabrication.

  Rumors circulate that there is about an order of magnitude
  performance difference between some of these chips.

  These hardware chips improve exponentiation speed about 3 orders
  of magnitude over software implementation benchmarked on an Intel
  8086 family microcomputer.

Whitfield Diffie writes about both the Cylink and Sandia chips.  And
is quoted at  http://www.aci.net/kalliste/nukearse.htm.

Sandia had terrible luck with its public key chips.  

I reported SOME of the troubles to Electronic Engineering Times editor Loring Wirbel [http://techweb.cmp.com/eet/823/] on March 23, 1994.

        Dr. John Wisniewski was a supervisor at Sandia's Center for
        Radiation-hardened Microelectronics.  Wisniewski was a graduate
        student at Washington State University in about 1975.  I was a
        professor at WSU.

        Wisniewski knows all about the failing Sandia chips in the nuclear
        arsenal.  I took notes on February 13, 1993.  Wisniewski reviewed
        the problems again for me.

             1    No quality initiative.  Each chip lot had a different
                  process.
             2    Overall yield - 40-50%.  Down to 10% after packaging.
             3    Metalization problems.  No planarization.  No flow of
                  glass.  Couldn't use high temperature.  Step coverage
                  problems.  Layed down over tension.  100% field returns
                  over several years.
             4    Sandia would store lots of parts for replacements.

        Sandia management made the decision to place low yield parts in
        the nuclear arsenal.  Sandia must meet DOD schedules management
        reasoned.  Hundreds of millions spent on CRM.  Sandia must show
        productivity.

        Wisniewski told me that low yield chip test survivors are those which
        the tests failed to detect failures.  Wisniewski will talk.  503-625-
        6408.  Wisniewski now works for Intel in Oregon.  Have Wisniewski
        tell you about the fire in the CRM clean room!

Sandia supervisor Jerry Allen later told me it cost $300,000 each to remove
Sandia's failing chips at Pantex from a nuclear bomb.

NSA apparently is biased toward hardware implementations of cryptographic
and authentication algorithms.  As opposed to software implementation.

NSA representatives and Sandia management decided not to use a public
key authentication scheme for its CTBT seismic data authenticator because
of all of the problems with implementing public key algorithms.

But NSA surely has spent MUCH MONEY on public key chip implementations.

NSA is promoting its Clipper crypto chips as described at http://cpsr.org/dox/clipper.html.

And we get some information about technical specifications of NSA's Clipper
chip at http://www.us.net/softwar/http://www.us.net/softwar/clip.html

  Clipper Chip Information

  MYK-78 CLIPPER CHIP ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION  ON A CHIP 

     1 micron double level metal CMOS technology 
     0.35 watts power 
     28 pin plastic leaded chip carrier (PLCC) package 
     Transistor to transistor logic (TTL) interface 
     Chip ID, family key and device unique key are installed at programming. 
     Chip ID, family key and device unique key are installed at programming           facility and are completely transparent to the user.

Therefore, Under the provision of the Freedom of Information Act, 
5 USC 552, I am requesting access to: 

1  Copies of all invoices from

	A   AT&T
	B   Motorola
	C   IBM
	D  Sandia National Laboratories

to NSA for payments for developing ANY public key-related chips between January 1, 1980 and February 27, 1998.

2  Copies of all invoices to NSA from ANY corporation involved in development
of ANY Clipper chip-related hardware between January 1, 1980 and 
February 27, 1998.

The public has a right to know how much NSA spent on TRYING monoploize the crypto
business.

If there are any fees for searching for, or copying, the records I have 
requested, please inform me before you fill the request.

As you know, the Act permits you to reduce or waive the fees when the 
release of the information is considered as "primarily benefiting the public."  
I believe that this requests fits that category and I therefore ask that you waive 
any fees.

If all or any part of this request is denied, please cite the specific exemption(s) 
which you think justifies your refusal to release the information and inform 
me of your agency's administrative appeal procedures available to me under the law.

I would appreciate your handling this request as quickly as possible, and I look 
forward to hearing from you within 20 working days, as the law stipulates.

With respect to our current FOIA lawsuit, I feel that we should settle this
unfortunate matter.

I see from your biography at  http://www.nsa.gov:8080/ and
http://www.nsa.gov:8080/dirnsa/dirnsa.html that you are

         1979   Distinguished Graduate
         Master of Arts degree in National Security Affairs 
         Naval Postgraduate School 
         Monterey, California

One of my former M.S. and Ph.D students in Computer Science,
Ted Lewis, is currently the chairman of Computer Science at
Naval Postgraduate School [http://www.friction-free-economy.com/].

Small world.

But I think that this emphasizes that WE SHOULD all be on the same side.
Not engaged in a conflict in US federal court.  Or on Internet.

NSA attempts to withhold requested information are possibly unwise.  

In our wired world the aggrieved know what happened to them. http://www.wpiran.org/,http://www.netlink.co.uk/users/impact/namir/namirm.html

And moderates in Iran, http://persia.org/khatami/biography.html, appear want
settlement too.

My family and I have been damaged by these crypto wars.

I ask you that consider fair settlement of damages caused by the National
Security Agency.

I cannot find your e-mail address on Internet.

Therefore I will forward the e-mail copy of this FOIA/settlement letter to 
Ray Kammer of NIST [http://www.nist.gov/], who along with the FBI 
[http://www.fbi.gov/, http://www.fbi.gov/fo/nyfo/nytwa.htmand], and NSA 
are trying to control the crypto business so that Kammer can possibly
forward an e-mail copy of the FOIA/Settlement letter to you.

Sincerely,

bill

William Payne
13015 Calle de Sandias
Albuquerque, NM 87111
505-292-7037 [I am not reading e-mail]





 





http://www.cylink.com/


http://www.jya.com/tis-p-bckrs.htm
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 13:53:33 -0500
From: nospam@synernet.com (Ed Stone)
Subject: Re: Another Network Associates U-Turn on Key Recovery
To: jy@jya.com

PGP Inc's new owner, Network Associates, has announced it is acquiring 
Trusted Informations Systems, Inc. On the TIS web site, the following 
project is detailed, in which Dr. Dorothy Denning was a subcontractor, 
and in which policy-based crypto key release systems were explored, in 
collaboration with the NSA, FBI, etc.:

Source: http://www.tis.com/research/crypto/crypt_krp_projsum.html

Policy-Based Cryptographic Key Release Systems
Cryptographic Key Release Language Design and Specification


View the quad chart graphic for the Policy-Based Cryptographic Key
Release System

Project Summary

ARPA Order Number: 8685 

Contractor: Trusted Information Systems, Inc. 3060 Washington Road
Glenwood, Maryland 21738 Phone: (301) 854-6889 FAX:
(301) 854-5363 

Subcontractors: Dr. Dorothy Denning
Dr. Burton Kaliski
Dr. Warwick Ford
Russel Housley

http://www.nsa.gov:8080/

http://www.nsa.gov:8080/dirnsa/dirnsa.html

1979   Distinguished Graduate
         Master of Arts degree in National Security Affairs 
         Naval Postgraduate School 
         Monterey, California

http://www.friction-free-economy.com/

http://www.nist.gov/

CPSR 
Computer Professionals 
for Social Responsibility
http://cpsr.org/dox/home.html
Clipper

Clipper Chip Information
http://cpsr.org/dox/clipper.html

MYK-78 CLIPPER CHIP ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION
                                          ON A CHIP 

http://www.us.net/softwar/http://www.us.net/softwar/clip.html

     1 micron double level metal CMOS technology 
     0.35 watts power 
     28 pin plastic leaded chip carrier (PLCC) package 
     Transistor to transistor logic (TTL) interface 
     Chip ID, family key and device unique key are installed at programming. 
     Chip ID, family key and device unique key are installed at programming facility and are completely transparent to the
     user.
Dear General Minihan:

Sincerely,



William H. Payne                   
13015 Calle de Sandias NE          
Albuquerque, NM 87111              
Books

   1.Bamford, James. The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency. 
   2.Hafner, Katie and John Markoff. Cyberpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on the Computer Frontier 
   3.Lapidus, Edith. Eavesdropping on Trial.. 
   4.Schneier, Bruce. Applied Cryptography 
   5.Sterling, Bruce. The Hacker Crackdown. 

     General Periodicals

   6.Slatalla, Michelle and Joshua Quittner. "Gangwars in Cyberspace. " Wired. 
   7.Baker, Stewart A. "Don't Worry, Be Happy." Wired. 
   8.Denning, Dorothy. "The Clipper Chip Will Block Crime." Newsday. 
   9.Dewitt, Philip Elmer. "Who Should Keep the Keys?" Time. 
  10.Lewis, Peter. "Now Congress gets to weigh in on Clinton's high-tech plan for wiretapping." New York Times. 
  11.Markoff, John. "Big Brother and the Computer Age." New York Times. 
  12.Markoff, John. "Flaw Discovered in Federal Plan for Wiretapping." New York Times. 
  13.Markoff, John. "Industry Defies U.S. on Data Encryption."New York Times. 

     Specialized Journals

  14.--. "Cylink Offers Triple-DES ICs for Civil Service Encryption." Electronic News. 
  15.Banisar, David and Ken Robinson. "Security and Privacy on the Information Highway." Educom Review. 
  16.Blackmon, Ric. "Data-Tapping Made Easy" Phrack. 
  17.Peterson, A. Padgett. "Clipper chip won't clip your wings, it will just protect the unprotected." Infoworld. 
  18.*Steal, Agent. "Tapping Telephone Lines Voice or Data for Phun, Money, and Passwords." Phrack. 
     * Pseudonym 

     Government Documents

  19.Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Wiretap Report. 
  20.Department of Justice. "Attorney General Makes Key Escrow Encryption Announcements." 
  21.House Subcommitte on Technology, Environment and Aviation. "Communications and Computer Surveillance, Privacy, and
     Security." 
  22.House Subcommitte on Telecommunications and Commerce. "Telecommunications Network Security." 
  23.Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 
  24.U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1993". 
  25.White House Press Secretary. "Clipper Press Release." 

     Institutional Sources

  26.Association for Computing Machinery, U.S. Public Policy Committee. "Computer Policy Committee Calls for Complete Withdrawl
     of Clipper." 
  27.Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association. "CBEMA Recommendations on Encryption Policy." 
  28.Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. "Clipper Fact Sheet." 
  29.Hanson, Robin. "Can Wiretaps Remain Cost-Effective?"Communications of the ACM 
  30.Hoffman, Lance, et al. "Cryptography Policy." Communications of the ACM. 
  31.Hoffman, Lance. "Clipping Clipper." Communications of the ACM. 
  32.Landau, Susan, et al. "Crypto Policy Perspecitves." Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery. 
  33.Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. "Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Is There Cause for Concern?" 

     Interviews 

  34.Lo, Virginia. Personal interview. 
  35.Schuman, David. Personal interview. 
  36.McClandish, Stanton. E-mail interview. 

     Exclusive Internet Soucres

  37.Rivest, Ron. "Re: Newsday Editorial." 
  38.Meeks, Brock. "Jacking in from the 'Sooner or Later' Port." CyberWire Dispatch 
  39.Gore, Al. "Letter to Representative Cantwell" 

     Other

  40.Delaney, Donald, et al. "Wiretap Laws and Procedures: What Happens When the U.S. Government Taps a Line." 
Purposes of this http://www.ihrwg.org/CP/ai82.htm

During 1981 Amnesty' International received hundreds of allegations of torture of political prisoners, in particular in Evin Prison in Tehran.
Some were supported by photographs and medical reports. The methods of torture described in these reports included beating, kicking,
whipping with cables, banging heads against walls, burning with cigarettes, burning with an iron and mock executions. One report described
a special room at Evin Prison called autog-e autoo (ironing room) in which prisoners were tied to a bed and their backs, buttocks and the
soles of their feet were burned with an iron. In another place in Evin Prison called zire zamin-e haqiqat (basement of truth) it was alleged
that prisoners were burned with cigarettes during interrogation.