From: Information Security <guy@panix.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Sep 1998 20:05:17 +0800
To: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Subject: Re: What we are Fighting
Message-ID: <199809071201.IAA01590@panix7.panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   >   From: Tim May <tcmay@got.net>
   >   >Information "I am not a klook" Security wrote:
   >
   >   >> Subject: Terrorist FBI, on Terrorism
   >   >> Date: Fri, 4 Sep 1998 09:58:23 EDT
   >   >>
   >   >> Statement for the Record
   >   >> FBI Director Louis J. Freeh before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
   >   >> September 3, 1998
   >
   >   >> The FBI supports a balanced encryption policy that satisfies fourth
   >   >> amendment concerns for privacy, the commercial needs of industry for
   >   >> robust encryption, and the government's public safety and national
   >   >> security needs.
   >
   >   But it bears constant repeating, especially to the skeptical, that there
   >   are NO DOMESTIC CRYPTO LAWS.
   >
   >   We all know this, but Freeh and Company continue to mumble about "meeting
   >   the legitmate needs of law enforcement." What can they be speaking of?
   >
   >   Obviously his side is contemplating domestic crypto restrictions.
   >
   >   They are planning domestic crypto restrictions, GAK, and all the rest of
   >   what we have long expected.

They have stated so openly; ~"if we hear a lot of encrypted hiss from [CALEA]
intercepts, we'll need GAK to be the law of the land". (a tilde before the
quote means I am paraphrasing).

In fact, at the same time the FBI used to say they weren't calling for
such a law, they were pushing behind the scenes for it.

*   http://epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi_dox/impact_text.gif
*
*   SECRET FBI report
*
*                   NEED FOR A NATIONAL POLICY
*
*   A national policy embodied in legislation is needed which insures
*   that cryptography use in the United States should be forced to be
*   crackable by law enforcement, so such communications can be monitored
*   with real-time decryption.
*   
*   All cryptography that cannot meet this standard should be prohibited.

And here's the ECHELON/UKUSA slant:

*   What Is The OECD
*
*   The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, based in
*   Paris, France, is a unique forum permitting governments of the
*   industrialized democracies to study and formulate the best policies
*   possible in all economic and social spheres.

: From owner-firewalls-outgoing@GreatCircle.COM Wed May 14 18:54:15 1997
: Received: from osiris (osiris.nso.org [207.30.58.40]) by ra.nso.org
:           (post.office MTA v1.9.3 ID# 0-13592) with SMTP id AAA322
:           for <firewalls@GreatCircle.COM>; Wed, 14 May 1997 12:56:13 -0400
: Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:58:46 -0400
: To: firewalls@GreatCircle.COM
: From: research@isr.net (Research Unit I)
: Subject: Re: Encryption Outside US
:
:
: I was part of that OECD Expert Group, and believe I may shine at least
: some light on what exactly was said and happened at the meetings.
:
: The main conflict during all sessions was the demand of the US to be
: able to decrypt anything, anywhere at any time versus the European
: focus: we want to have the choice - with an open end - to maintain
: own surveillance.  The US demand would have caused an immediate
: ability to tap into what the European intelligence community believes to
: be its sole and exclusive territory. In fact the Europeans were not at all
: pleased with the US view points of controlling ALL crypto. Germany and
: France vigorously refused to work with the US on this issue.
:
: The Clipper initiative (at the time not readily developed) was completely
: banned, except for the Australian and UK views that felt some obligation
: from the 1947 UKUSA treaty (dealing with interchange of intelligence).
:
: With a vast majority the US was cornered completely, and had to accept
: the international views. And actually adopted those as well.  EFF, EPIC and
: other US organizations were delighted to see the formal US views barred,
: but expressed their concern on the development of alternate political
: pressure that would cause the same effects.
:
: As time went by that was indeed what the US did, and up to now with minor
: success.
:
: Bertil Fortrie
: Internet Security Review

Declan, wanna track down this person and find out the names of those
who spoke of the ultra-secret UKUSA treaty that's never been seen,
and interview them?

----

When Sonny Bono hit a tree, yet another Senator convinced by the FBI/NSA's
little presentation of horrors (which is preceded by a visible sweep for
electronic bugs) was lost. Only an Executive Order seems like it will get
domestic crypto "outlawed".

One continued worrisome slant to the FBI/NSAs pushing for domestic GAK
is that they use the same arguments for retaining export controls (which
Clinton did by Executive Order, or they would have expired) as they give
for wanting to extend these controls domestically.

LART me if I'm wrong, but that makes the issue different from most
other export-controlled non-secret technology/products.

----

I still think someone (without a job ;-) should test the export law
by pulling in PGP from outside the US and then immediately putting
it back at the same site.

If could find someone on the lower East Side willing to do it
for $5000. Gilmore, care to make another investment in making
the government's position look silly? ;-)

---guy