From: Information Security <guy@panix.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Sep 1998 20:22:38 +0800
To: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Subject: Re: [Fwd: ISAKMP Key Recovery Extensions]
Message-ID: <199809071219.IAA01745@panix7.panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   >   From: "William H. Geiger III" <whgiii@invweb.net>
   >
   >   In <35F37E90.76109489@brd.ie>, on 09/07/98 
   >      at 07:34 AM, "Frank O'Dwyer" <fod@brd.ie> said:
   >
   >   >Well, the attached draft is not designed for corporate recovery of
   >   >encrypted email, that's for sure.
   >
   >   4.  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
   >
   >   This document was produced based on the combined efforts of the protocol
   >   subcommittee of the Key Recovery Alliance.
   >
   >   Why am I not surprised?
   >
   >   I hope the IETF will not accept the implementation of *any* GAK proposals
   >   into the RFC's. If these people want to force Big Brother on us they
   >   should not have the benefit of the IETF to do so.


    ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rfced-exp-markham-00.txt
    
     o Government Requirements: Governments must be able to intercept the
    CKRB at the time of key establishment or periodically while the
    security association remains active. This requires that the key
    recovery enabled entity transmit the CKRB during the key establishment
    protocol and every N hours during the security association.

Whooey!

They've been infiltrated by idjits.
---guy