cryptoanarchy.wiki

Arise, you have nothing to lose but your barbed wire fences!

1992-11-28 - security on a multiuser system > You get the picture. There is no security on a multiuser system. > > It is possible to get security on a multiuser system (there are at > least B3 rated systems out there),

Header Data

From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
To: uunet!novavax.nova.edu!yanek@uunet.UU.NET
Message Hash: abf071a5336263946e15558f6f050180cc77ddb173672803bfc330c97ae2a860
Message ID: <9211282230.AA13299@xanadu.xanadu.com>
Reply To: <9211282159.AA28597@novavax.nova.edu>
UTC Datetime: 1992-11-28 22:48:26 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 28 Nov 92 14:48:26 PST

Raw message

From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Sat, 28 Nov 92 14:48:26 PST
To: uunet!novavax.nova.edu!yanek@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: security on a multiuser system > 	 You get the picture. There is no security on a multiuser system. >  > It is possible to get security on a multiuser system (there are at > least B3 rated systems out there),
In-Reply-To: <9211282159.AA28597@novavax.nova.edu>
Message-ID: <9211282230.AA13299@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 That is fine as long as you trust all the entities that designed,
	 built, (modified :-), programmed, installed, and administer the system.

You can inspect the design, the code, the installation, and probablyu
even the administration of the system.  That would typically be
economically infeasible, however, so to reduce your expense, you'll
have to trust someone (preferably someone who stands to lose a lot if
they defect).

dean

Thread