1994-03-30 - the rest of the key

Header Data

From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 1ad59e0a53d5401d803db2f0e3ff560a4966e4ff0ecf2a51d0dc00940064380c
Message ID: <199403301705.JAA19822@well.sf.ca.us>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1994-03-30 17:05:28 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 30 Mar 94 09:05:28 PST

Raw message

From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 30 Mar 94 09:05:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the rest of the key
Message-ID: <199403301705.JAA19822@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

 I was just wondering.... If the NSA could get it's hands on half
(40) of any particular clipper key, wouldn't that just leave 2^40
to compute? Even with brute force, it's trivial  even next to DES.


Brian Williams
Extropian
Cypherpatriot

"Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced comunication is
                  indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham

 "Have you ever had your phones tapped by the government? YOU WILL
  and the company that'll bring it to you....  AT&T" --James Speth
 
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RQ7xIRT+ixXBfKMnSDdcScdV9OqR6JcQJFru88zynqj4XaU6u1olYKPKJhjpO1ry
nE8vHi4UO8qkg4B3cnf2XZVlkwrICTzGGhZjHuqws0R3C++1AGmVBA/UrlHQxwZn
h9jU4GRUHQI=
=xVfX
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