1994-03-30 - the rest of the key
Header Data
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 1dacd72bc397494d5e3ec7948e4e9e6217ca9ef68796eba1a497763dc4922627
Message ID: <9403301750.AA00784@ah.com>
Reply To: <199403301705.JAA19822@well.sf.ca.us>
UTC Datetime: 1994-03-30 18:04:20 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 30 Mar 94 10:04:20 PST
Raw message
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Wed, 30 Mar 94 10:04:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the rest of the key
In-Reply-To: <199403301705.JAA19822@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9403301750.AA00784@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
> I was just wondering.... If the NSA could get it's hands on half
>(40) of any particular clipper key, wouldn't that just leave 2^40
>to compute? Even with brute force, it's trivial even next to DES.
"half" is a a random number which is XOR'd with 80 bits. Both halves
look random. The XOR of the two halves is not.
Eric
Thread
Return to March 1994
- Return to “Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>”
- Return to “hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)”
Return to “Jim Gillogly <jim@rand.org>”
- 1994-03-30 (Wed, 30 Mar 94 09:05:28 PST) - the rest of the key - Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
- 1994-03-30 (Wed, 30 Mar 94 09:28:10 PST) - Re: the rest of the key - Jim Gillogly <jim@rand.org>
- 1994-03-30 (Wed, 30 Mar 94 10:04:20 PST) - the rest of the key - hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)