From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
To: Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com
Message Hash: 26f1f18c40c8ee28b0c5312978db71079e003dca74d19b6244c3d7acc61dcd9a
Message ID: <199404121924.AA04683@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
Reply To: <chefeWqSMUw840qsFt@transarc.com>
UTC Datetime: 1994-04-12 19:29:16 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 12 Apr 94 12:29:16 PDT
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Tue, 12 Apr 94 12:29:16 PDT
To: Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com
Subject: Re: Crypto, satellites, & China
In-Reply-To: <chefeWqSMUw840qsFt@transarc.com>
Message-ID: <199404121924.AA04683@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
> It's my understanding that, according to international missile
> treaties (probably the MTCR), missile telemetry data must be
> transmitted in the clear. This is ostensibly so that the various
> world powers can be assured that a "test" missile launch really is a
> test and is not going to wipe out someone's capital. It's also so
> that various intelligence agencies can have accurate estimates of
> everyone's capabilities. This knowledge is widely viewed as
> stabilising.
No, I think the MTCR is like ITAR: it restricts who may export what.
The MTCR is the rationale behind why we don't export rocket engines to
countries like Pakistan who are believed to be developing IRBMs. Of
course, some dual-use technology probably slips through, just as it
has with ITAR and COCOM.
All of the strategic arms reduction treaties include a provision for
telemetry monitoring, but I didn't think "ordinary" satellite launches
were covered. Especially in the case of commanding; you really don't
want J. Random Hacker to reorient the attitude or orbit of your
comsat.
-Paul
--
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG | Out the 10Base-T port, through the router,
perobich@ingr.com | over the leased line, off the bridge, past
Intergraph Federal Systems | the firewall... nothing but net.
Of course I don't speak for Intergraph.
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