From: solman@MIT.EDU
Date: Sun, 17 Jul 94 11:58:52 PDT
To: rarachel@prism.poly.edu (Arsen Ray Arachelian)
Subject: Re: Key length security (calculations!)
In-Reply-To: <9407171624.AA16313@prism.poly.edu>
Message-ID: <9407171856.AA01803@ua.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> To quote you:
> <<Not to attack Doug's point, which has validity here (that we don't
> know what factoring advances NSA may have made), but I personally
> think the combined capabilities of "public domain mathematicians" are
> now far greater than what NSA has. Shamir, Odzylko, Blum, Micali,
> Rackoff, Goldwasser, Solovay, Berlenkamp, etc., are top-flight
> researchers, publishing many papers a year on these topics. It is
> unlikely that some GS-14 mathematicians at the Fort, not able to
> publish openly, have made much more progress. I think the resurgence
> of crypto in the 70s, triggered by public key methods and fueled by
> complexity theory breakthrough, caused a "sea change" in inside
> NSA-outside NSA algorithm expertise.
> >>
> 
> 
> You mention Shamir, etc.  However I would point out that even if any of the
> original RSA mathematicians found a better factoring algorithm, they'd be 
more
> than likely to keep it under lock and key.  The obvious reason is that their
> money supply depends on such an algorithm being suppressed.

What about Shamir's triple pass key exchange protocol (explained briefly
below). Its the perfect key exchange algorithm. It obsoletes Public key
systems entirely as long as you only need to exchange keys and not
authenticate. I'd say that is pretty decent evidence that he does still
do things to help the field when it might hurt RSADSI. (although I wouldn't
say the same thing about all of them)

Triple pass key exchange:

Choose a commutative symetric encryption algorithm.

Step 1: A encrypts the session key in his personal symetric key (he doesn't
        share it with anybody) and sends the message to B: Ea(K)
Step 2: B encrypts this in her personal symetric key and sends it back
        to A: Eb(Ea(K))
Step 3: A decrypts the message and sends it back to B: Da(Eb(Ea(K)))
        Since we chose a commutative algorithm, this is Eb(K).
Step 4: B decrypts with her key and Eve (ala Scheier) has no clue. Mallet
        can't intercept your communication, but he can talk to you and
        unless you have some sort of authentication impersonate Eve.

Example commutative algorithm out of Schneier by Shamir based on the
hardness of factoring:

Choose a large prime, p. Choose an encryption key e that is a large prime
less than p. Choose a d so that d*e mod (p-1) = 1 (i.e. the muliplicative
inverse of e in mod (p-1)).

C = P^e mod p
P = C^d mod p

Cheers,

Jason W. Solinsky