From: "Ian Farquhar" <ianf@wiley.sydney.sgi.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Sep 94 16:43:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Laws Outside the U.S.
In-Reply-To: <9409202313.AA10990@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
Message-ID: <9409210936.ZM14678@wiley.sydney.sgi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sep 21,  9:13am, Matthew Gream wrote:
> - The Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) is our primary SIGINT/COMSEC
>   agency. Much like the NSA (but on a smaller scale, their HQ in
>   Canberra consists of 3 or 4 buildings only, surrounded by razor
>   fencing though and my "driver" swears the radio went dead as I
>   stepped out for a closer look :>)

I don't know about that, but I do know that the building is completely
TEMPEST shielded.  It was custom built for DSD 2-3 years ago, when they
moved to Canberra from Melbourne.

>   they provide COMSEC advice to the
>   Govt. They are also the ones that deal with authorising crypto
>   products for export under s.13B & 13E as mentioned above.

DSD provides both COMSEC and COMPUSEC, and is surprisingly open about
SIGINT too.  I must admit that I have found them to be surprisingly
helpful on most occasions, although they do take security VERY seriously.

> So far there don't seem to be any moves here in Australia to change
> what legislation is already in place. Though, I must admit that I
> haven't gone into depth on this and am relying only upon what the
> Department of Transport and Communications and our Attorney General's
> Department have told me [by letter and telephone]. Ian Farqhar might
> have some comments on the Law Enforcement Access Committee.
                                            ^^^^^^

Law Enforcement Advisory Committee.  That might have been my mistake,
as I once did miscall them that.

Not much, no.  They're heavily secretive, and my understanding is that
they consist of representatives of the Attorney General's department,
ASIO and the Australian Federal Police.  They were mentioned to me
in passing as one body which might have a lot of interest in controlling
domestic cryptography, and I also understand that they were involved
in the deliberations over the A5/1 and A5/2 decision (which, I am told by
Austel - Telecommunications  watchdog - was quite different to what was
reported on the Internet).  I must admit to finding myself quite irritated
that bodies like the LEAC (which are, after all, advising government on
domestic policy) are so secretive.

							Ian.