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1995-02-02 - Re: Why encrypt intra-remailernet.

Header Data

From: eric@remailer.net (Eric Hughes)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: f0ef489ef334e5562ed018d62c61e9a52a1e3d472ac4e59e84b3fbaa6930e93e
Message ID: <199502021635.IAA07634@largo.remailer.net>
Reply To: <Pine.3.89.9502011857.B8923-0100000@jake.bga.com>
UTC Datetime: 1995-02-02 16:36:40 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 2 Feb 95 08:36:40 PST

Raw message

From: eric@remailer.net (Eric Hughes)
Date: Thu, 2 Feb 95 08:36:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Why encrypt intra-remailernet.
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.89.9502011857.B8923-0100000@jake.bga.com>
Message-ID: <199502021635.IAA07634@largo.remailer.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: Nathan Zook <nzook@bga.com>

   When I say that the Mark I remailers are laughably easy to crack, I mean
   laughably easy.

By whom?  I am hearing a general denunciation of the current remailer
system.  These blanket denials are false on their face, because they
are not true in every circumstance.

   The only reason that our systems are actually able to do any good is that
   our threat model _is not_ an LEA--with government resources, and government
   patience.

_Our_ threat model?

There is not one threat model.  Each person has their own threat model
and their own desired level of security.  An individual also desires
more security for some messages than others.  The current remailer
network is good for some purposes and bad for others.

Every evaluation of security _must_ include the nature of the security
desired, because there is no single concept called "security" which is
the same in every situation.

Eric

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