From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Tue, 5 Sep 95 14:11:36 PDT
To: Lucky Green <shamrock@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: Forgery, bills, and the Four Horsemen (Articles and Comment)
In-Reply-To: <v02120d03ac7260cb02e3@[192.0.2.1]>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.950905165830.3229A-100000@access2.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Tue, 5 Sep 1995, Lucky Green wrote:

> Date: Tue, 5 Sep 1995 12:45:44 -0800
> From: Lucky Green <shamrock@netcom.com>
> To: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>, cypherpunks@toad.com
> Subject: Re: Forgery, bills, and the Four Horsemen (Articles and Comment)
> 
> At 23:44 9/4/95, Black Unicorn wrote:
> [...]
> 
> >3.  The corruption of e-cash to further the above.
> >
> >If the government is disturbed by the laundering of money enough
> >to actually print, or even propose printing, two kinds of
> >currency, how will they respond to untraceable, unaccountable and
> >infinitely liquid e-cash?  I think the answer is in past behavior:
> >e-cash will be linked to the four horsemen and subjected to
> >rigorous reporting requirements- systems which are true e-cash
> >will be banned.
> 
> This is unnecessary, since there is no "true" ecash. DigiCash's ecash in
> its current form, the only version David Chaum is willing to licenese, is
> fully traceable. Popular Cypherpunk's myths nonwithstanding.

Perhaps true, but this assumes that the Chaum method is the only method, 
which I believe to be incorrect.  Perhaps I should use the term "future 
e-cash models" or "True Digital Cash."

Currently there is no "true" e-cash implemented (as far as I know), but 
this is part of the problem.

The product introduced to the public, the original market release
will be (is) traceable, why should the public expect anything different?  In
addition this is exactly what I was talking about in deterring the use of
"real" e-cash.  Real e-cash will be seen as an anomoly, a perversion of e-cash 
to make it sneaky for the four horsemen (or that's how I would play it to 
the public were I a statist).

> 
> First, the recipient of funds is non-anonymous by design. Second, any payer
> can trivialy make the recipient of a ecash note known by revealing the
> blinding factor. For purposed of lawenforcement, DigiCash's ecash in no
> more secure than if the (insert horseman here) billed his fees to a credit
> card.
> 

Again, one more reason that "real" e-cash will be banned.  The public 
doesn't need it as an alternative is widely available.

This is the curse (or gift) of crippleware- its use as a diversion.
See also, Clipper

> -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com>
>    PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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