1995-09-05 - Re: Forgery, bills, and the Four Horsemen (Articles and Comment)

Header Data

From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green)
To: Black Unicorn <cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: f7c3cfdafffedc44b981f708d547a3c23f487b03b997927253c110b2c3950516
Message ID: <v02120d03ac7260cb02e3@[192.0.2.1]>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1995-09-05 19:43:09 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 5 Sep 95 12:43:09 PDT

Raw message

From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Tue, 5 Sep 95 12:43:09 PDT
To: Black Unicorn <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Forgery, bills, and the Four Horsemen  (Articles and Comment)
Message-ID: <v02120d03ac7260cb02e3@[192.0.2.1]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 23:44 9/4/95, Black Unicorn wrote:
[...]

>3.  The corruption of e-cash to further the above.
>
>If the government is disturbed by the laundering of money enough
>to actually print, or even propose printing, two kinds of
>currency, how will they respond to untraceable, unaccountable and
>infinitely liquid e-cash?  I think the answer is in past behavior:
>e-cash will be linked to the four horsemen and subjected to
>rigorous reporting requirements- systems which are true e-cash
>will be banned.

This is unnecessary, since there is no "true" ecash. DigiCash's ecash in
its current form, the only version David Chaum is willing to licenese, is
fully traceable. Popular Cypherpunk's myths nonwithstanding.

First, the recipient of funds is non-anonymous by design. Second, any payer
can trivialy make the recipient of a ecash note known by revealing the
blinding factor. For purposed of lawenforcement, DigiCash's ecash in no
more secure than if the (insert horseman here) billed his fees to a credit
card.


-- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com>
   PGP encrypted mail preferred.







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