From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: a33eb43eed20d884a5375efdb14f1a7e6b9a22f0e85580a794508d4ae623ff95
Message ID: <199509122051.QAA14953@pipe4.nyc.pipeline.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1995-09-12 20:51:22 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 12 Sep 95 13:51:22 PDT
From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Sep 95 13:51:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: GAK/weak crypto rationale?
Message-ID: <199509122051.QAA14953@pipe4.nyc.pipeline.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Responding to msg by Andrew.Spring@ping.be (Andrew Spring) on
Tue, 12 Sep 7:3 PM
>A more cautious conclusion would be would be that the
>importance (to the LEA's) of the busts made with
>crypto is much larger than the numbers suggest. You
>could interpret that a lot of ways: I suspect that
>high-profile career-enhancing cases are highly
>dependent on wiretaps.
In response to an audience question about wiretaps and
crypto, Mr. Michael Nelson of the White House said at the
NIST GAK meeting (paraphrased):
We are not concerned with bad people using crypto among
themselves, we can handle that. We are more concerned
with their using crypto to communicate with regular
folks, to make legitimate arrangements -- finance,
supplies, travel, and so on -- for their nefarious
deeds. It's the intermix of the bad with the good that's
the problem.
Maybe someone else at the meeting heard this differently
and will comment, but this seems to mean that the Feds can
track, and maybe crack, the crypto-intercomm of "bad
people" so long as it is not buried in a torrent of public
crypto use. And not commingled with lawful, ECPA-
protected(?), communication.
Anybody want to elaborate what Mr. Nelson was implying
about wiretaps and crypto?
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