1995-10-12 - Re: Judicial Access to Keys (Was: Re: Banque des Cypherpunks)

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From: futplex@pseudonym.com (Futplex)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Message Hash: 07b4b7b31441a91dc93728cc3153efbd5078413eb2ec154b48ca2d9cd4bca16f
Message ID: <199510120730.DAA01478@thor.cs.umass.edu>
Reply To: <199510112243.SAA21752@universe.digex.net>
UTC Datetime: 1995-10-12 07:30:13 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 12 Oct 95 00:30:13 PDT

Raw message

From: futplex@pseudonym.com (Futplex)
Date: Thu, 12 Oct 95 00:30:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Re: Judicial Access to Keys (Was: Re: Banque des Cypherpunks)
In-Reply-To: <199510112243.SAA21752@universe.digex.net>
Message-ID: <199510120730.DAA01478@thor.cs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Scott Brickner writes:
> I don't rember if any key-splitting schemes currently allow it, but how
> about this:  the escrow agencies would be the courts, requiring one
> assent from each judge on the appeals chain.  As each judge rules
> against the defendant or denies the appeal, he adds his piece of the
> key to the ruling.  When you reach the top of the chain, then *and only
> then* can you be traced.

JAK (Judicial Access to Keys) sounds as though it wouldn't give the LEAs a 
chance to pre-emptively snoop on message traffic before prosecution, unlike
POTS wiretaps and Clipper. I don't see the govt. ever favoring such a
scheme that doesn't help the LEAs to "gather" evidence to justify an
indictment. They will probably skip JAK instead <ducking ;>....

-Futplex <futplex@pseudonym.com>




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