From: Adam Shostack <adam@lighthouse.homeport.org>
To: jim@acm.org
Message Hash: e9178517df96af0ff85c8065ce7dd8d8670aad81bd7287300609dbb8b6581906
Message ID: <199512121525.KAA09078@homeport.org>
Reply To: <199512111920.LAA24338@mycroft.rand.org>
UTC Datetime: 1995-12-12 17:21:21 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 13 Dec 1995 01:21:21 +0800
From: Adam Shostack <adam@lighthouse.homeport.org>
Date: Wed, 13 Dec 1995 01:21:21 +0800
To: jim@acm.org
Subject: Re: Timing Cryptanalysis Attack
In-Reply-To: <199512111920.LAA24338@mycroft.rand.org>
Message-ID: <199512121525.KAA09078@homeport.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
Jim Gillogly wrote:
| > Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb@nsb.fv.com> writes:
| > Hey, don't go for constant time, that's too hard to get perfect. Add a
| > *random* delay. This particular crypto-flaw is pretty easy to fix.
| > (See, I'm not *always* arguing the downside of cryptography!)
|
| Random delay may be harder to get perfect than constant time. Note that
| the actual time for the transaction is the minimum of all the transaction
| times you measure, since you can't add a negative delay to them. It's
| presumably even easier if the random distribution is known. Adding a
| random delay means more transactions are required to find each new bit,
| but information is still leaking.
Does the delay have to be random, or does the total time for a
transacation need to be unrelated to the bits in the secret key?
Assume that the time added is pseudo-random (and confidential).
Further, for any non-overlapping group of N transactions, the
distribution of the times fits some predetermined curve, say a bell
curve.
We've added a non random number, but since those numbers end
up being a curve, it would be difficult to determine which transaction
got which time added to it. This resembles the 'make them all a
constant time', but allows us to send out some in a shorter time than
the maximum (although most transactions should probably take longer
than the average.)
Adam
--
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
-Hume
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