From: "Peter D. Junger" <junger@pdj2-ra.F-REMOTE.CWRU.Edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 1996 06:11:47 +0800
To: Cypherpunks <shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Subject: Re: Crippled Notes export encryption
In-Reply-To: <v02120d67ad2c263c30f9@[192.0.2.1]>
Message-ID: <m0tfCQA-0004KjC@pdj2-ra.F-REMOTE.CWRU.Edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Lucky Green writes:

: At 4:17 1/24/96, Timothy C. May wrote:
: 
: >The usual issue: That if a foreign-originated product even appears to be a
: >standard (so far, none have been), and includes strong crypto, then the NSA
: >and other agencies will simply change the rules. Thus, if extremely strong
: >crypto from "Netscape-Zurich" starts to have a significant market presense
: >in the U.S., then some law will be passed to restrict it.
: 
: I agree. The reason for enforcing ITAR is to keep good crypto of the
: *domestic* market. If ITAR no longer accomplishes that, new laws will be
: passed.

That is not so clear.  The ITAR are regulations, not a law passed by
Congress.  The ITAR regulations relating to the export of cryptography
are probably not authorized by any law (as well as being
unconstitutional).  The reason for all the silly twists and turns
under the ITAR is that the censors never succeeded in getting any law
forbidding the use of cryptography, and it is not at all certain that
they could get such a law passed.

There is very little that can be done under the ITAR to keep
Netscape-Zurich from spreading and it is Congress, not the Office of
Defense Trade Controls or the NSA that passes laws.

--
Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH
Internet:  junger@pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu    junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu