1996-03-09 - Re: (INFO) Leahy/Goodlatte introduce crypto bill

Header Data

From: jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>
To: Voters Telecommunications Watch <cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: d2570e10dd680d63fa6eafa72bec615a4e1c0412dc44ae044f8ff0029c7bcaa8
Message ID: <m0tuWWi-00091XC@pacifier.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-03-09 19:27:15 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 10 Mar 1996 03:27:15 +0800

Raw message

From: jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>
Date: Sun, 10 Mar 1996 03:27:15 +0800
To: Voters Telecommunications Watch <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: (INFO) Leahy/Goodlatte introduce crypto bill
Message-ID: <m0tuWWi-00091XC@pacifier.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


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At 12:17 PM 3/5/96 -0500, Voters Telecommunications Watch wrote:

Dear Mr. Sadfar,

By now I'm sure you've read a few items that I posted not only to you, but 
also to the cypherpunks mailing list, as well as the 
NWLIBERTARIANS@teleport.com list.  I believe you have made a grievous error 
in your position apparently supporting the Leahy bill.  As you presumably 
understand by now, based on your description of the bill it contains an 
extraordinarily serious flaw, in that it makes a new crime concerning the 
USE of encryption.

Ostensibly, this is "reasonable," but I've already presented a scenario on 
Cypherpunks (also posted to you; as I write this it may not yet have 
appeared there, but I copied you) in which the government uses this 
provision maliciously to go after anonymous remailers.  While that was 
merely a specific example, almost any service that protects the identity of 
its customers and allows them network access is potentially at a serious 
risk, because the US government has been known to fabricate a crime (for 
example, the "Amateur Action" BBS case from a few years ago) in order to 
make criminals out of non-criminals.

As you have quoted it, Leahy's bill allows the government to, in effect, 
"stalk" a service provider (anonymous encrypted remailer, anonymous digital 
cash bank, Internet access provider, etc) and create a crime that involves 
the provider well beyond the standards described in this bill.  The 
government can CREATE a crime, "to order" as it were, and snare the service 
provider in the net, despite the fact he has done nothing wrong. (In fact, 
he could be "guilty" even if there was no way, short of going out of 
business, to avoid the "crime.")   This, I hope you agree, is totally 
unacceptable, but despite this, you said: 

>This provision only applies to you if you are using encryption to
>specifically foil a law enforcement investigation AND the communication
>relates to a felony AND you are using the communication to commit the
>felony.  VTW feels this is a fairly narrowly drawn statute that is not
>likely to be easily abused.

Frankly, you made an error, and "it was a doozy!"  But what I fear is that 
you will "dig your heels in" and hesitate to admit it, and continue on 
calling this "a good bill."  You _would_ be right about that, except for the 
specific portion that is referred to above.

(In addition, as Padgett Petersen noticed on Cypherpunks, that portion of 
the bill seemingly contains an error of phrasing, although we can't tell and 
we are depending on your quoting of that bill.  Please verify that the 
quotation you made was accurate, and please carefully read that portion to 
see if you can identify the  problem both Mr. Petersen and I observed.  
Since it just about reverses the entire meaning of the paragraph, it is 
vital to know what the actual bill said and meant.)

I strongly recommend that you _DRAMATICALLY_ change the tone of your 
support:  Please make it clear that your support for this bill is ENTIRELY 
conditional on removing the offending section. (I see little or no problem 
with your description of the rest of the bill, except for a few items I 
mention below.)  I certainly invite any challenge you'd care to make to my 
reasoning and logic:  If you feel I'm wrong in my estimation of what the 
government could do with that portion of the bill, say so and back up your 
analysis.  If, on the other hand, you recognize that I'm right, or at least 
on the right track, I think you have a certain moral responsibility 
to ensure that this "wolf in sheep's clothing" doesn't get by the shepherd.

Remember, in your press release you said:

>VTW believes this legislation is an excellent initiative. 


It would be far more accurate to say, "This legislation COULD BE an 
excellent initiative, if a short section were removed."

>We predict that the White House will do everything in their power to
>prevent Senator Leahy from liberating PGP.  He will need your help to
>push forward.

If this is REALLY true, then he will have to listen to our suggestions, 
right?  People listen WHEN THEY HAVE TO CONVINCE YOU OF SOMETHING.  Failing 
to make Leahy aware of what we consider terribly wrong with that bill would be 
irresponsible.  If Leahy REALLY wants the bill passed, and "all" the 
potential supporters insist on the removal of the offending section, he will 
have no choice but to do so, since it has already been widely predicted that 
the administration will oppose it.  If, indeed, they will oppose it, they 
will oppose it REGARDLESS of whether it contains that bad spot or not.


>Over the next few months, VTW will be coordinating a coalition of
>names, many of which are already familiar to you.  This coalition will
>ask you to call and write to Congress, expressing your opinion, and
>threatening to back it up with the ultimate legitimate weapon of
>democracy, your vote in this election year.

While I do indeed intend to vote in this election year, as you may be aware 
I believe there are other weapons the public will eventually be able to use 
against recalcitrant politicians and government employees of all types.  The 
government is presumably well aware of my position, and it would certainly 
not be unexpected if they were desperately trying to avoid what I consider 
to be an inevitable conclusion.  This particular bad section, in what is 
probably an otherwise-good bill, seems tailor-made to fight against 
developments that I think this society and "our" government can't avoid, and 
shouldn't avoid.

I'm not asking you to endorse, or for that matter even acknowledge, my 
theories.  However, you should at least take notice of the fact that 
Congress' motivations are clearly to maintain its power over the citizenry, 
and they will presumably act in predictable fashion to achieve this goal.  
We've already got them on the run; they can't pass Clipper and they knew 
they couldn't prosecute Zimmermann, and their position on ITAR is 
resoundingly criticized by individuals and industry alike.  Most people 
agree that these rules have to change; it would be a tragedy if we "gave 
away the store" just to get a few trinkets.  

The fact is, this bill didn't have to contain the offending section, and it 
doesn't have to keep it.  If we make our absolute opposition to that portion 
clear, who will stand up and support it?  Only those people within 
government who secretly want this bill to pass, that's who!


____________________________________________________________
>A FEW QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
>

>Q: Wasn't Goodlatte one of the bad guys on the Communications Decency Act?
>   Why is he sponsoring this bill, and can we trust him?
>A: Goodlatte did indeed introduce the fatal amendment that made the House
>   version of the Telecomm Bill unsupportable. Nevertheless, VTW has found
>   that a Congressperson's vote on one sort of bill is little indication of
>   his or her stand on others. VTW wil closely examine any change in the
>   language of the bill throughout its Congressional life.

Well, frankly, it looks like SOMEBODY managed to sneak in a pit into the 
cherry pie.   (or a worm into the apple!)   I wonder who could have done 
this?  What do you want to bet that there aren't any fingerprints on it?!?


>Q: Does this create a new obligations for key holders to disclose keys that
>   they wouldn't have to comply with before?
>A: No. In fact, this bill makes it harder for a law enforcement official to
>   retrieve a key from a key holder, by requiring a wiretap request instead
>   of a simple search warrant.

In my opinion, key escrow agents should be required to inform THEIR CLIENT, 
the actual user of the key, BEFORE giving the key to the cops. They should 
also be obligated to fight any such request if the key holder requests it.  
(Remember, if key-escrow is really voluntary, then it is a contract between 
the encryption-user and the key escrow agent, and the encryption user should 
be able to put whatever conditions he wishes on that relationship.  
Presumably, he would not have entered into that relationship unless he was 
able to control the disposition of the key.) Furthermore, the cops should 
not be allowed to do any decryption of any material wiretapped before they 
possess the key itself.


In summary, I think you really need to revisit your support for this bill.  
It is only a short distance away from being a good bill, but that is a trip 
we must make if we are to protect and even expand our freedom.

Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com

Klaatu Burada Nikto




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