From: jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 1996 07:17:03 +0800
To: "Deranged Mutant" <WlkngOwl@UNiX.asb.com>
Subject: Re: Why escrow? (was Re: How would Leahy bill affect crypto over HAM
Message-ID: <m0twuXn-00092BC@pacifier.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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At 01:39 AM 3/13/96 +0000, Deranged Mutant wrote:

>They may use secret sharing or splitting methods and handle parts by 
>different organizations within themselves and hand other parts to an 
>outside agent.  Sometimes this makes sense when there are political 
>rivalries within an organization.  They want the ability to get into 
>Dilbert's files if he drops dead, but they want an objective party to 
>hold part of the key so his rivals don't try to steal his files.

Notice, however, how the government seems to be assuming that "key escrow" 
(to the extent that it is implemented at all!) gets implemented in a way 
which is "friendly" to government agents.  They assume that there is one key 
that is available at one location, one that is well-marked and identified, 
unencrypted, and is available for pickup 24 hours per day assuming they 
present the proper credentials or court order.

Even the most limited planning could easily develop a system that achieves 
all the benefits of escrow for the user, but is essentially impossible for 
government agents (or for that matter, anyone else!) to use to the detriment 
of the user.