From: jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 1996 19:56:03 -0700 (PDT)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Re: crypto in .ja (fwd)
Message-ID: <m0uCGuD-0009OsC@pacifier.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 12:07 PM 4/24/96 -0400, David Lesher wrote:
>Forwarded message:
>
>X-URL: http://www.us.net/~steptoe/276915.htm
> 
>> Emerging Japanese Encryption Policy
>> 
>> By Stewart A. Baker 
>{}
>> Summary: The emerging Japanese consensus on cryptography
>

quoted from article:

>In the United States and Europe, encryption policy is formed by a mix of 
>interests.  Advocates of business, national security agencies, and more 
>recently the police -- all play a large role in the policy debate.  

Notice that Stewart Baker didn't include as one of those groups, "The 
public."  In a typical Freudian slip, he reveals that the interests of the 
public don't seem to count for much, according to government-types like he 
used to be.

>And Japanese police face severe political and constitutional constraints on 
>wiretapping, so the prospect of losing this criminal investigative tool 
>seems not to be as troubling to the Japanese government as to the United 
>States and many European nations.

Why is it that I suspect that there are no greater "constitutional 
restraints" on wiretapping in Japan; just more concern to maintaining 
constitutional behavior?


>Others suggested that the solution was to have two levels of encryption -- 
>reserving the most powerful 
>for government and national security while encouraging commercial encryption 
>standards that are less strong.  This approach, however, has proven to be a 
>dead end in the United States, where any cryptographic strength deemed 
>exportable has immediately been condemned as insufficient by business and 
>cryptography experts.

More distortions.  Baker tries to imply that the decision on what is 
exportable bears no relationship to what is considered sufficient, whereas 
in fact we know that export approval practically requires an insecure system.

>All in all, the emerging Japanese consensus on cryptography could pose a 
>major challenge to U.S. (and perhaps European) government hopes of striking 
>a compromise between commercial and governmental interests with respect to 
>cryptographic policy.  


He continues to ignore public interest...  And lest he try to imply that 
government represents that "public interest," I should hasten to add 
"individual interest."

>If Japan puts the weight of its government and industry behind strong, 
>unescrowed encryption, competitive pressure will quickly doom any attempt to 
>influence this technology through export controls and standard-making.  
>Governments will be forced to choose between overt regulation in the Russian 
>and French manner or laissez-faire policies of the sort that now prevail in 
>the domestic markets of countries like the United States, Great Britain, and 
>Germany.

I would hardly characterize the US's policy towards encryption as "laissez 
faire."  The moment the patents on public-key encryption were granted, that 
presented a substantial impediment towards the use of that system by the 
public.  That ain't "laissez faire"!  The act of proposing Clipper was 
intended to deter competing systems of unescrowed encryption.  That ain't 
"laissez fair."


>Whether Japanese policy will in fact coalesce around a purely commercial 
>approach to cryptography remains to be seen.  In response to the analysis 
>above, one senior MPT official stated that the U.S. and European concerns 
>had not been well understood in Japan until the OECD meeting and that the 
>MPT's study group would be giving special importance to the issue in its 
>review of electronic payment systems.  Thus, it is apparently still 
>possible that Japan will join with the U.S. and European governments in 
>seeking to shape a more accessible encryption standard.


A "more accessible encryption standard"?   War is peace.  Freedom is 
slavery.  Plaintext is encrypted.
 

>Because the same key pair may be used for encryption as for signature, 
>escrowing signature keys would also allow access to encrypted communications 
>that use the same key pair. The problem with this approach is that it would 
>also add a layer of insecurity to the entire digital signature structure, 
>allowing those with access to the escrow system not just to decrypt but also 
>to forge messages from registered users.  Since there is little 
>law-enforcement reason for being able to conduct such forgeries, adding this 
>layer of insecurity has been rejected in U.S. policy circles. 


"Little law enforcement reason"???  Uh, pardon me, but could you mention 
what that little reason is?


>While MITI formally supports discussions of cryptography policy on an 
>international basis, the Clipper Chip was highly unpopular in Japan for a 
>variety of reasons.  There's a strong antipathy to wiretaps among the 
>Japanese people.  Wiretaps are lawful with a warrant, but remain 
>controversial.  Therefore, the Clipper Chip's law 
>enforcement rationale did not resonate in Japan. 

What Baker forgot to say is that there may be an equally strong antipathy to 
wiretaps among Americans, according to polls I've heard of. The difference 
is, the people aren't getting their way WRT wiretaps.   And the Clipper 
proposal was DOA here, as well.

Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com