From: Adam Shostack <adam@lighthouse.homeport.org>
To: smith@sctc.com (Rick Smith)
Message Hash: ab2e8760c0ac5598f1b9e45f8b163bb7186f0e0a48e09187f432649e4bcf66b8
Message ID: <199604262137.QAA09079@homeport.org>
Reply To: <199604261557.KAA20525@shade.sctc.com>
UTC Datetime: 1996-04-27 05:39:09 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 27 Apr 1996 13:39:09 +0800
From: Adam Shostack <adam@lighthouse.homeport.org>
Date: Sat, 27 Apr 1996 13:39:09 +0800
To: smith@sctc.com (Rick Smith)
Subject: Re: trusting the processor chip
In-Reply-To: <199604261557.KAA20525@shade.sctc.com>
Message-ID: <199604262137.QAA09079@homeport.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
Ross Anderson's "Programing Satans Computer" springs to mind.
www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/
Ross' papers are up there on my list of very worthwhile reading.
Adam
Rick Smith wrote:
|
|
| cwe@it.kth.se (Christian Wettergren) writes:
|
| >Take a look at the IEEE Symp on Security and Privacy Proceedings from
| >1995, I believe it was. There was a paper there about security bugs in
| >the Intel processors, enumerating a number of them in 80386 for example.
| >There where at least one or two byte sequences that plainly stopped
| >the processor.
|
| Yes, and this is where the real risks are. The original question was
| entirely about explicit subversion. The larger risk is accidental
| flaws. Same with software in most cases.
|
| Rick.
| smith@sctc.com secure computing corporation
|
--
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
-Hume
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