From: Rick Smith <smith@sctc.com>
To: cwe@it.kth.se
Message Hash: eafc82f588636f92cd22c4fae3a89a5cd0ccfacaee9fc478221d4723db4da631
Message ID: <199604261557.KAA20525@shade.sctc.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-04-27 02:35:15 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 27 Apr 1996 10:35:15 +0800
From: Rick Smith <smith@sctc.com>
Date: Sat, 27 Apr 1996 10:35:15 +0800
To: cwe@it.kth.se
Subject: Re: trusting the processor chip
Message-ID: <199604261557.KAA20525@shade.sctc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
cwe@it.kth.se (Christian Wettergren) writes:
>Take a look at the IEEE Symp on Security and Privacy Proceedings from
>1995, I believe it was. There was a paper there about security bugs in
>the Intel processors, enumerating a number of them in 80386 for example.
>There where at least one or two byte sequences that plainly stopped
>the processor.
Yes, and this is where the real risks are. The original question was
entirely about explicit subversion. The larger risk is accidental
flaws. Same with software in most cases.
Rick.
smith@sctc.com secure computing corporation
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