From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@schloss.li>
Date: Sat, 25 May 1996 06:28:54 +0800
To: Martin Minow <minow@apple.com>
Subject: Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
In-Reply-To: <v02140b02adc99220960b@[17.202.12.102]>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.93.960524114856.657E-100000@polaris.mindport.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Wed, 22 May 1996, Martin Minow wrote:

> Black Unicorn <unicorn@schloss.li> comments on the responsiblity
> of prudent persons (in, I presume, the context of threating e-mail
> sent through an anonymous remailier).
> 
> I'm still perplexed: what can a "prudent" remailer operator do if a
> threatening e-mail was sent through a remailer under one or more of
> the following conditions:
> 
> -- The remailer operator is legally enjoined from reading messages
>    transversing his system. (For example, the remailer is subject to
>    data privacy laws.)

Nothing.  Perhaps block e-mail from the address the threat mail was sent
from after a certain number of legitimate complaints.

This, of course, depends on the threats/whatever being sent to the
remailer in question as a 'first in chain' mailer.

> -- The message was encrypted using the intended recipient's public key.
>    (This means that, without access to the private key, the operator
>    has no mechanism to examine the e-mail.)

Ask the recipient if he or she wishes all encrypted mail addressed to his
or her key to be supressed.

> Confused in Cupertino.
> 
> Martin Minow
> minow@apple.com
> 
> 
> 

---
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"In fact, had Bancroft not existed,       potestas scientiae in usu est
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