1996-05-23 - Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns

Header Data

From: minow@apple.com (Martin Minow)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 7655d7e36d3dca581ac2e0ef0b14e8b3bab42a9654c158a00b282ba63b975aec
Message ID: <v02140b02adc99220960b@[17.202.12.102]>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-05-23 09:01:39 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 23 May 1996 17:01:39 +0800

Raw message

From: minow@apple.com (Martin Minow)
Date: Thu, 23 May 1996 17:01:39 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
Message-ID: <v02140b02adc99220960b@[17.202.12.102]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Black Unicorn <unicorn@schloss.li> comments on the responsiblity
of prudent persons (in, I presume, the context of threating e-mail
sent through an anonymous remailier).

I'm still perplexed: what can a "prudent" remailer operator do if a
threatening e-mail was sent through a remailer under one or more of
the following conditions:

-- The remailer operator is legally enjoined from reading messages
   transversing his system. (For example, the remailer is subject to
   data privacy laws.)

-- The message was encrypted using the intended recipient's public key.
   (This means that, without access to the private key, the operator
   has no mechanism to examine the e-mail.)

Confused in Cupertino.

Martin Minow
minow@apple.com







Thread