From: jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>
Date: Mon, 27 May 1996 17:59:53 +0800
To: Black Unicorn <unicorn@schloss.li>
Subject: Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
Message-ID: <199605270636.XAA02836@mail.pacifier.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 02:12 AM 5/27/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote:
>On Sat, 25 May 1996, jim bell wrote:
>
>> >	Why the first in chain? If the anti-traffic-analysis provisions are
>> >working properly, it should be impossible to prove that a given first remailer
>> >was the first remailer for any particular message. I had thought that even
>> >civil courts required that you be the person who committed some act, not the
>> >person who _might_ have committed some act. Otherwise, all the remailers are
>> >in danger. This is even if someone tries an entrapment by sending through some
>> >illegal material - if the courts accept that they should be allowed to do this,
>> >then all the remailers they chained are going to be hit.
>> 
>> Likewise, I don't see why the first address in the chain is vulnerable, as 
>> long as the message subsequently passes through at least one trustworthy 
>> remailer, and probably  a temporary output address.  
>
>I repeat, all it takes is one person to send through only one remailer
>(perhaps even a Co$ plant) and the first in chain remailer is toasted.
>
>Think before you type please.

You should take your own advice.  The mere fact that the first link in the chain is "known" doesn't mean that it is provably involved.  Without a substantial amount of bugging that the COS hasn't the resources to do, there is a big difference between them _believing_ that a given message originated there, and being able to prove it in court.  And notice my caveat:  "As long as the message subsequently passes through at least one trustworthy remailer, and probably a temporary output address."


Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com