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Arise, you have nothing to lose but your barbed wire fences!

1996-05-22 - Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns

Header Data

From: Rich Graves <llurch@networking.stanford.edu>
To: Ben Holiday <ncognito@gate.net>
Message Hash: d0c515338724d21b9913f7026cae82aec25b8ec0732f09b2f092d2986e6061df
Message ID: <Pine.GUL.3.93.960521195547.6458S-100000@Networking.Stanford.EDU>
Reply To: <Pine.A32.3.93.960521152031.52974B-100000@hopi.gate.net>
UTC Datetime: 1996-05-22 06:35:50 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 22 May 1996 14:35:50 +0800

Raw message

From: Rich Graves <llurch@networking.stanford.edu>
Date: Wed, 22 May 1996 14:35:50 +0800
To: Ben Holiday <ncognito@gate.net>
Subject: Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
In-Reply-To: <Pine.A32.3.93.960521152031.52974B-100000@hopi.gate.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.GUL.3.93.960521195547.6458S-100000@Networking.Stanford.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Tue, 21 May 1996, Ben Holiday wrote:

> After pondering a bit it seems to me that the "knock knock" remailer
> approach (only send anon-mail if the recipient agrees to receive it) could
> be made feasable pretty easily.
> 
> Rather than hold the mail while waiting for a consent to release, you
> could simply encrypt the peice of mail with a symetric algorythm on its
> final hop, and send the encrypted mail to the recipient. 

Interesting idea, but anything requiring specific software on the user's
end is a losing proposition IMO. 

remailer-operators@c2.org removed cuz I ain't one.

-rich

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