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1996-07-24 - Re: Brute Force DES

Header Data

From: Adam Shostack <adam@homeport.org>
To: deviant@pooh-corner.com (The Deviant)
Message Hash: 4422ac103aa0168ec4dd98474d46e394677adbec85cab6a875212ebe3d92db88
Message ID: <199607241301.IAA00906@homeport.org>
Reply To: <Pine.LNX.3.94.960724063243.1558B-100000@switch.sp.org>
UTC Datetime: 1996-07-24 15:11:15 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 24 Jul 1996 23:11:15 +0800

Raw message

From: Adam Shostack <adam@homeport.org>
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 1996 23:11:15 +0800
To: deviant@pooh-corner.com (The Deviant)
Subject: Re: Brute Force DES
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.94.960724063243.1558B-100000@switch.sp.org>
Message-ID: <199607241301.IAA00906@homeport.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


	Most protocols give you stereotyped headers, which are
perfectly valid for known plaintext attacks.  The rc4 cracks were done
on the Netscape rc4(md5(key+salt) used in ssl.  They were based on
known plaintext in the HTTP headers.

	(Incidentally, we might want to test the key distribution &
reporting mechanisms on a crack of vanilla rc4-40, or another SSL
crack.  Cracking des will not be cheap, and we should do some test
runs first.)

Adam

The Deviant wrote:

| > For instance if you had a DES encrypted gzipped file. The first 2 bytes
| > plaintext will be Ox1f8b. You'd only have to try to fully decrypt

| Buy the point is to prove that DES shouldn't be used, not that it CAN
| be brute forced.  A known-plaintext attack doesn't show that.  We hafta
| attack something we've never seen. (i.e. talk Netscape, or some other
| company, into generating a DES'd message, and keeping the keys safe)


-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume

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