From: jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Jul 1996 11:30:18 +0800
To: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
Subject: Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:)
Message-ID: <199607252223.PAA24106@mail.pacifier.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 03:03 PM 7/25/96 -0400, Simon Spero wrote:
>On Thu, 25 Jul 1996, jim bell wrote:
>> My guess?  They all agree to kill whoever made that suicidal rule.  
>> Otherwise, all but two would end up dead.
>
>But the people at the start of the line know that if they don't 
>hang together, they will end up dead, and if that they act purely 
>selfishly only the last two will benefit. Because they want to stay 
>alive, a better solution for the first person to propose equal shares, 
>which would be opposed by the last two players, but supported by the rest.
>He could also split the money only amongst the first half of 
>the gang, since he only needs half the votes.

My previous answer was incomplete, of course.  I continue to believe that 
the problem is unsolveable as stated, if for no other reason than the 
"weight" of the negative represented by dying is not stated.  It's a VERY 
complex problem, unless there's some trick I'm not seeing.

Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com