From: jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>
To: “Deranged Mutant” <WlkngOwl@unix.asb.com>
Message Hash: ba589c2a20e572de6b7351e5494ca4591e77dd467a28e84a213acfc0bb27034f
Message ID: <199607101545.IAA29371@mail.pacifier.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-07-10 20:49:46 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 11 Jul 1996 04:49:46 +0800
From: jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 1996 04:49:46 +0800
To: "Deranged Mutant" <WlkngOwl@unix.asb.com>
Subject: Re: MSoft crypto API's
Message-ID: <199607101545.IAA29371@mail.pacifier.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
At 04:51 AM 7/10/96 +0000, Deranged Mutant wrote:
>On 9 Jul 96 at 20:34, jim bell wrote:
>[..]
>> Unexplained: What if the program Microsoft is asked to sign is not
>> intended for export? Presumably, NSA has no authority, then, and thus
>
>They could insist on only signing exportable software, and in theory
>use that as ITAR-relaxing leverage.
>
>Methinks it's a bad move to only have MS sign software... presumably
>they won't outright refuse to sign competitors software. It would be
>a conflict of interest for them not to... very usable as evidence
>against MS in an anti-trust suit. Independent CA's would be better.
Yes, that's the anti-trust vulnerability I mentioned. It is unclear if
Microsoft could legitimately refuse to sign any software presented to it,
regardless of its legal exportability.
>IMO, it gives a false sense of sucurity to even require crypto apps
>to be signed. A lot of folks would want a developer's kit (probably
>cost $$$) to get around that requirement... nice loophole, BTW, for
>those that can afford it. Or until somebody patches the code to
>ignore bad signatures of lack of them and releases the patch.
I'm sure that will happen!
>> presumably Microsoft shouldn't be able to refuse to sign anything they're
>> asked.
>
>Why? Assuming there were no export restrictions... if it's signed by
>MS, people will take it to mean that MS is vouching for it. If they
>sign a library that does 'naughty things' or is an incredibly
>incompetant implementation of an algorithm, it could turn out to be
>bad PR for them. (Hm... they could use this as an excuse to read
>competitor's source code.)
What MS would be signing for is the GENUINENESS of the software, not its
effectiveness. Sorta analogous to key-signatures in PGP.
Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com
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1996-07-10 (Thu, 11 Jul 1996 04:49:46 +0800) - Re: MSoft crypto API’s - jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>