From: qut@netcom.com (Dave Harman OBC)
Date: Mon, 2 Sep 1996 07:42:13 +0800
Subject: Re: It is good that anon.penet.fi has been closed!
In-Reply-To: <199609011733.MAA31382@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <199609012143.OAA20934@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


! Yes, subject says it all. anon.penet.fi was a whole lot worse than
! cypherpunks remailers. It provided clueless users with no real security,
! because it stored return addresses and did not use chaining and
! encryption.
! 
! Maybe closing of anon.penet.fi will spur real interest from the unwashed
! alt.sex.* masses to the truly secure remailers.

There has to be more crypto anonymizing aliasing remailers and with easier
interfaces.  Closing the Kleinpaste derived server will help put the 
pressure of demand to start better remailer systems.  There's not enough
capacity and reliability with the servers extant.  There should be 
thousands of full featured remailers.

We'll help out as soon as we can get the hardware problems we have figured
out and provided there's understandably configurable linux networking 
software out there. 

Would it be a good idea to have a 100% open server that anyone can 
telnet in and copy all the e-mail data?  If the chaining crypto 
remailers are reliable, there's no reason why not, except the risk of
clock cycle cryptanalysis.  There should be an easy way of preventing
those attacks, if not, the data can be read accessable only after the
{de|en}cryption.  This openness should go a long way in protection
so far as liability is concerned.

In other words, if Big Brother can force his way into your privacy,
why not little brother?