From: “Douglas R. Floyd” <dfloyd@io.com>
To: varange@crl.com (Troy Varange)
Message Hash: 61aca450ea745b9588fb1e81e874dbe936e08246218e76cf222d211e0b15d9d8
Message ID: <199609082159.QAA13284@xanadu.io.com>
Reply To: <199609080449.AA28514@crl11.crl.com>
UTC Datetime: 1996-09-09 00:33:21 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 9 Sep 1996 08:33:21 +0800
From: "Douglas R. Floyd" <dfloyd@io.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 1996 08:33:21 +0800
To: varange@crl.com (Troy Varange)
Subject: Re: What the NSA is patenting
In-Reply-To: <199609080449.AA28514@crl11.crl.com>
Message-ID: <199609082159.QAA13284@xanadu.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>
> Burning the floppy would seem to solve the problem. Lock sensitive
> data in RAM away from disks except for burnable floppies. I guess
> linux can be configured to keep sensitive data in a RAM filesystem,
> keeping it from being synced or flushed.
>
Currently, I am hacking up a prototype of an armored keysigning box using
an old 386.
This box signs/decodes incoming E-mail as long as the key switch is in the
correct position. The key remains in /dev/ram0, and is encrypted, as well
as stored in a .au file. For one of the keys, I am using a hacked des
program that reads a file off a floppy for the TDES key before copying the
PGP key into the ramdrive.
What I plan to do is write software so that multiple floppies are needed
to load the key into the RAM filesystem, and to "lock" the machine.
After the key is loaded, all network daemons are killed except smail, and
all gettys are killed. This makes it hard for someone locally to get to
the RAM drive. If the box is rebooted, or turned off -- bye bye RAM
drive.
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