From: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay@got.net>
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 1996 09:26:31 -0700 (PDT)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Kantor on GAK
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.16.19961011122915.0a6f0018@pop.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <v03007800ae8433cf4e0a@[207.167.93.63]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 8:29 AM -0400 10/11/96, John Young wrote:
>   The New York Times, October 11, 1996, p. A38.

>   Unbreakable encryption generates the need for "key"
>   management among personal and business users of encryption
>   products. Users may need a "spare key" to recover

As businesses and others point out, if there's a need, let private industry
fill the need. Let the users decide on who, if anyone, holds the spare
keys. The USG proposal takes this choice away and allows access to others.

>   You assume that foreign buyers would not buy key-recovery
>   products, but you ignore the trend -- especially in Europe
>   -- to require use of key-recovery products and bar the
>   import of stronger and stronger encryption products that do
>   not take law enforcement into account.

So, because some countries will not allow import into _their_ countries of
non-GAK software, this means GAK must be mandated on U.S. _exports_? Since
when it is our responsibilty to enforce other nation's import laws?
(Because Iran will not allow the import of blasphemous literature, should
the USG ban all export of such material from the U.S.?)


>   The number of companies that have expressed a willingness
>   to work with the Administration to balance commercial and
>   law enforcement issues belies your pronouncement that our
>   proposal is unworkable. In fact, the number of companies

This conveniently ignores the substantial bludgeon the USG holds over the
heads of all high-tech companies. Their "willingness to work with the
Administration" is comparable to the willingness of a kidnap victim to
"work with" his kidnapper.


>   Mickey Kantor
>   U.S. Secretary of Commerce
>   Washington, Oct., 9, 1996


The real goal is obviously domestic GAK and domestic limits on encryption,
else all this is mostly worthless.

--Tim May



"The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM
that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology."
[NYT, 1996-10-02]
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."