From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 1996 05:30:54 -0700 (PDT)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Kantor on GAK
Message-ID: <1.5.4.16.19961011122915.0a6f0018@pop.pipeline.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   The New York Times, October 11, 1996, p. A38.


   Clinton's Encryption Plan Fits Law and Market

   To the Editor:

   "A Flawed Encryption Policy" (editorial, Oct. 4)
   mischaracterizes the Clinton Administration's recent
   proposal on data-scrambling software, the proposal's impact
   and the results of a study by the National Research
   Council.

   This Administration has never proposed that United States
   citizens be limited in the type of encryption products they
   choose to use domestically. The current plan relates only
   to exports of encryption products that are, for all
   practical purposes, unbreakable in the commercial
   environment.

   Unbreakable encryption generates the need for "key"
   management among personal and business users of encryption
   products. Users may need a "spare key" to recover
   information that is lost or otherwise inaccessible, in much
   the same way that we give a trusted neighbor a spare key to
   our house. President Clinton's plan insures that the United
   States -- and not other countries -- will develop such a
   system, which both protects and is based on the rule of
   law, not the whim of governments or trade barriers
   masquerading as import restrictions.

   You assume that foreign buyers would not buy key-recovery
   products, but you ignore the trend -- especially in Europe
   -- to require use of key-recovery products and bar the
   import of stronger and stronger encryption products that do
   not take law enforcement into account.

   The number of companies that have expressed a willingness
   to work with the Administration to balance commercial and
   law enforcement issues belies your pronouncement that our
   proposal is unworkable. In fact, the number of companies
   that stand ready now to market such products will soon
   prove that there Is a market for encryption products that
   provide safeguards for both the owner and for society.

   The National Research Council did not say that we should
   allow the export of all encryption. It supported some
   export controls, while allowing the export of encryption up
   to the strength of 56 bits. Our plan allows the export of
   encryption up to 56 bits, but does so in a way that will
   encourage the production and marketing of products that
   both protect privacy and prevent crime.

   The United States is the world leader in information
   technology. Under the Administration's plan, we will remain
   so through a market-driven key-recovery system that both
   promotes the export of encryption products and protects our
   national security and the public safety.

   Mickey Kantor
   U.S. Secretary of Commerce
   Washington, Oct., 9, 1996