1996-10-22 - Re: OTP

Header Data

From: “gweissman@spyrus.com” <gweissman@spyrus.com>
To: paul@fatmans.demon.co.uk
Message Hash: 2e2feafc695e955e1793ee63c406aeedbf1b02c7afc8037dac2c4a2bf15fcc80
Message ID: <326BAC7A.39C6@spyrus.com>
Reply To: <845910392.8251.0@fatmans.demon.co.uk>
UTC Datetime: 1996-10-22 00:02:10 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 21 Oct 1996 17:02:10 -0700 (PDT)

Raw message

From: "gweissman@spyrus.com" <gweissman@spyrus.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 1996 17:02:10 -0700 (PDT)
To: paul@fatmans.demon.co.uk
Subject: Re: OTP
In-Reply-To: <845910392.8251.0@fatmans.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <326BAC7A.39C6@spyrus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


paul@fatmans.demon.co.uk wrote:
> 
> > Can you explain to me how your one time pad algorithm is any better than
> > encryption something with, say, RC4 or any other cipher using a key that
> > is the same length as the seed for your PRNG?
> 
> Well for a start there is no possible cryptanalytic (rather than
> brute force) attack on a one time pad, the system can be
> mathematically proven to be secure with a very simple bit of
> statistics.
> 
>

Ooops : there is no possible attack at all with a properly
implmented OTP cryptosystem.  There is no keyspace to "brute-force"
search.  Any message is as likely as any other.  Check Schneier.





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