From: jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 1996 10:32:27 -0700 (PDT)
To: "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" <froomkin@law.miami.edu>
Subject: Re: Your editorial in the 10/14 PCWeek
Message-ID: <199610181732.KAA29096@mail.pacifier.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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At 11:55 AM 10/17/96 -0400, Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law wrote:
>On Wed, 16 Oct 1996, Marshall Clow wrote:
>[...]
>> In a paper about privacy and the original Clipper proposal (in 1994) 
>...Jan '95 actually...
>> A. Michael Froomkin of the University of Miami School of Law pointed out
>> that since the entire key-escrow infastructure was created by
>> presidential decree, and the proposed key holders were part of the
>> executive branch, the provisions for release of the keys could be
>> changed at a moment's notice by another presidential decree, which need
>> not ever be made public. [ Yo, key escrow dude! Email your key database
>> to wiretappers@fbi.gov, and don't tell anyone! ]
>
>I still think this is a major issue; it is one, however, that goes away if
>they pass a well-drafted statute.

Are you sure about that?  "If they pass a well-drafted statute," the 
president couldn't just declare a "national emergency" (similar to all of 
the other "national emergencies" we are under right now) and send that same 
message to the key-keepers demanding they send their databases?

Given the massive misbehavior of government in general, I'm not at all 
confident something like this couldn't happen.

I'm waiting for the first indication that these GAK systems will include 
some sort of government-fraud-preventative measures, possibly an irrevocable 
allowance (or even a requirement?) that any key holder can publicize the 
fact of any key request at the time it is made, or after a minimal time like 
a couple of weeks or so.  That way, government abuse of the system would be 
revealed, beyond the control of the government.


Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com