From: Dale Thorn <dthorn@gte.net>
Date: Sat, 23 Nov 1996 19:53:07 -0800 (PST)
To: Igor Chudov <ichudov@algebra.com>
Subject: Re: IPG Algorith Broken!
In-Reply-To: <199611240059.SAA16286@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <3297C65F.4F7@gte.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> Black Unicorn wrote:
> > On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, Eric Murray wrote:
> > > John Anonymous MacDonald writes:
> > > > At 8:09 AM 11/23/1996, Eric Murray wrote:
> > > > >No, you can't.  It's impossible to prove an algorithim unbreakable.

> > > > No?  Please prove your assertion.

> > > You can't prove a negative.  The best IPG could say is that
> > > it can't be broken with current technology.
> > > Next week someone might come up with a new way
> > > to break ciphers that renders the IPG algorithim breakable.

> > Someone needs to write an IPG and Don Wood FAQ.  No, I'm not volunteering.

If you want to do that, why not do so as a response to Don's FAQ?

> As a crypto amateur, I would appreciate a good technical explanation as
> to why IPG's algorithm cannot be considered secure.

Is the concept here that:  Whereas conventional crypto generates/hashes
a *key* with which to encode the text, IPG generates a *pad* from a key,
more or less the length of the text, with which to encode the text??

It seems to me they're putting an additional layer of stuff ("OTP") between
the key generation and the actual encoding, so what's the problem with that,
as a concept?