From: wichita@cyberstation.net
Date: Sat, 30 Nov 1996 00:27:49 -0800 (PST)
To: Dale Thorn <dthorn@gte.net>
Subject: Re: IPG Algorith Broken!
In-Reply-To: <3297C65F.4F7@gte.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.BSI.3.95.961130022230.19278E-100000@citrine.cyberstation.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, Dale Thorn wrote:

> Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> > Black Unicorn wrote:
> > > On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, Eric Murray wrote:
> > > > John Anonymous MacDonald writes:
> > > > > At 8:09 AM 11/23/1996, Eric Murray wrote:
> > > > > >No, you can't.  It's impossible to prove an algorithim unbreakable.
> 
> > > > > No?  Please prove your assertion.
> 
> > > > You can't prove a negative.  The best IPG could say is that
> > > > it can't be broken with current technology.
> > > > Next week someone might come up with a new way
> > > > to break ciphers that renders the IPG algorithim breakable.
> 
> > > Someone needs to write an IPG and Don Wood FAQ.  No, I'm not volunteering.
> 
> If you want to do that, why not do so as a response to Don's FAQ?
> 
> > As a crypto amateur, I would appreciate a good technical explanation as
> > to why IPG's algorithm cannot be considered secure.
> 
> Is the concept here that:  Whereas conventional crypto generates/hashes
> a *key* with which to encode the text, IPG generates a *pad* from a key,
> more or less the length of the text, with which to encode the text??
> 
> It seems to me they're putting an additional layer of stuff ("OTP") between
> the key generation and the actual encoding, so what's the problem with that,
> as a concept?
> 
That is one reasonable interpretation/explanation  of what we are doing.
It is also extremely fast and is used one time only, guaranteed unless the
user deliberately sabotages their own system.
The process is quite simple and discussed in detail at our web site,

               netprivacy.com

Obviously, a number of you have read it. 

With kindest regards,

Don Wood