1996-11-21 - Re: Stewart Baker on new crypto rules

Header Data

From: Lucky Green <shamrock@netcom.com>
To: Hal Finney <hal@rain.org>
Message Hash: ce6abb321d14995c4c4fc5468df3ace6ab137ae276c8931b406f42692933df9a
Message ID: <Pine.3.89.9611202018.A26330-0100000@netcom14>
Reply To: <199611210227.SAA11010@crypt.hfinney.com>
UTC Datetime: 1996-11-21 04:17:29 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 20 Nov 1996 20:17:29 -0800 (PST)

Raw message

From: Lucky Green <shamrock@netcom.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Nov 1996 20:17:29 -0800 (PST)
To: Hal Finney <hal@rain.org>
Subject: Re: Stewart Baker on new crypto rules
In-Reply-To: <199611210227.SAA11010@crypt.hfinney.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.89.9611202018.A26330-0100000@netcom14>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Wed, 20 Nov 1996, Hal Finney wrote:

> What I see this as is a call to come up with architectures that will allow
> transparent phase-in of government key access (so-called "key recovery")
> technology.  The current HP proposal fits in very well with this model.
> The appear to be planning on using standard API's so that applications
> will be able to switch to using key escrow software without changing the
> applications themselves, just the OS.  Maybe there could be a transition
> period where both the old and new crypto would both be accepted, then
> after a period of time the old wouldn't work any more.

Just so we are all clear about what HP is up to: in August, 1996, I
attended a presentation by HP's policy person. He was touting the
anti-four horsemen properties of HP/TIS/unnamed other's "voluntary" "key
recovery"  system. When I pointed out to him that voluntary GAK could not
possibly defend against criminals using strong crypto, since such
criminals are unlikely to register their keys with the "escrow" agency, he
replied: 

"There are many 
possible interpretations of the words 'voluntary' and 'mandatory'."

I am willing to testify to this under oath.

I don't know what dictionary HP is using. Orwell himself must have 
written it.

--Lucky





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