1996-12-31 - Re: premail.

Header Data

From: Big Moma <moma@nym.alias.net>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: f7086d2afcf43b2a49d934c2e85c0d4f11faf4a1c4e216503d4c3a123f4c13fa
Message ID: <19961231204939.16032.qmail@anon.lcs.mit.edu>
Reply To: <199612310718.BAA02863@manifold.algebra.com>
UTC Datetime: 1996-12-31 20:50:05 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 31 Dec 1996 12:50:05 -0800 (PST)

Raw message

From: Big Moma <moma@nym.alias.net>
Date: Tue, 31 Dec 1996 12:50:05 -0800 (PST)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: premail.
In-Reply-To: <199612310718.BAA02863@manifold.algebra.com>
Message-ID: <19961231204939.16032.qmail@anon.lcs.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

ichudov@algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) wrote:
> Anonymous wrote:
> > 
> > A scenario:
> > 
> > 1) The spooks put a bug (named Eve) on the link between
> > kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu and the Internet.
> ......
> A good scenario. A truly paranoid premail users should verify who signed
> the remailer keys. If you trust the signators and they signed the keys, 
> you are "safe". Just do pgp -kvv some@remailer.com and see what comes up.
> Maybe remailer operators should asks someone reputable to sign their
> remailers' keys so that the users can easily verify the signatures.

	Yes, that is one part of it. Another part is that Raph should
include a public PGP key in the premail program and then sign both the
remailer-list and the pubring at kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu with it. The public
key included in premail should be

1) Used to sign the premail distribution itself.
2) Emailed to various mailing lists such as cypherpunks and also mirrored
at various internet sites, so it cannot be spoofed by spooks.