1997-01-07 - Re: The Upcoming DES Challenge

Header Data

From: Bernie Doehner <bad@uhf.wireless.net>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 3f675699dc7dd0392f48dacc9b50d3121a25d1cdf3b406f05d0921d765606e93
Message ID: <Pine.BSF.3.95.970107085847.283B-100000@uhf.wdc.net>
Reply To: <Pine.BSF.3.95.970106201656.1932A-100000@bitbucket.edmweb.com>
UTC Datetime: 1997-01-07 14:09:41 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 7 Jan 1997 06:09:41 -0800 (PST)

Raw message

From: Bernie Doehner <bad@uhf.wireless.net>
Date: Tue, 7 Jan 1997 06:09:41 -0800 (PST)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Upcoming DES Challenge
In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSF.3.95.970106201656.1932A-100000@bitbucket.edmweb.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.BSF.3.95.970107085847.283B-100000@uhf.wdc.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

> I think a completely known-plaintext attack would not impress the
> masses. Consider how often crypto illiterate programmers implement
> ciphers (such as Vigenere variants) which are obviously vulnerable to
> known-plaintext attacks. The idea seems to be that if you know the
> plaintext, what do you need the key for? _We_ may know better, but I
> think we are in the minority.

You have got to be kidding!
Where are you getting this "idea" from? Since when is recovering the
plaintext following and preceeding the known plaintext not of
_any_ interest?

In regards to known ciphertext. Can't you just calculate the time
required to successfuly perform known ciphertext only attack from the time
to successfuly break known plaintext?

I agree with earlier posters. I am glad RSA putting up some real money for
this and as such I respect their design of the contest. 

What I am curious about is wether the chaining mode will be "given" as
part of the contest, but I'll gladly wait till AFTER Peter is done with
his program to get an answer.


Bernie Doehner