From: jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Feb 1997 07:12:46 -0800 (PST)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: If guilty of a lesser crime, you can be sentenced for a greater
Message-ID: <199702031512.HAA25755@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 07:10 PM 2/2/97 -0600, ichudov@algebra.com wrote:
>jim bell wrote:
>> 
>> Better yet, set up a system to encourage the public to USE those guns (and 
>> other weapons) to get rid of the people who pass such laws, and the problem 
>> is solved.
>> 
>
>How about this scenario: I borrow 1 million dollars from, let's say,
>Phill Hallam-Baker. Not wanting to pay it back, I pay to the
>assassination bot and arrange him to be murdered.

Simple.  Even if a lendor dies (whether by murder or some other cause, 
perhaps undetermined) you (the debtor) presumably will still be obligated to 
pay back the debt, to his estate if nowhere else.  If you WEREN'T 
responsible for the killing, you should still make the payments. If you do, 
then you had no reason to kill him in the first place.

Even in the hypothetical scenario that the lendor is single, has no family 
or other likely heirs, it would be in his interest to declare that his 
estate goes to charity, including debts to it such as yours.  After all, we 
can assume that he doesn't want to get murdered, and the best way of 
avoiding that fate is to remove whatever incentive might otherwise exist for 
anyone else to kill him.  Making sure that all of his debtors are revealed 
would make it difficult for any of them to get away with murder.  Or, at 
least, prevent the fact of such a murder from eliminating the need to repay 
the debt.

If the fact of the loan were revealed, perhaps only after the lendor's 
death, and ALSO the fact that you (alone among his other debtors) refused to 
pay it back, everyone else in that society might reasonably come to the 
conclusion (absent proof or a good explanation to the contrary) that you 
were probably responsible for the death.  At the very least, they wouldn't 
want to deal with you for fear of a similar outcome (non-payment or death), 
and some of the public would be likely to punish you by donating money to 
see you dead.  They would do this, even if they had no particular link to 
the dead lendor, precisely because the publicity from such an outcome would 
deter other people who might be contemplating a similar thing.

The logic is essentially the same as the situation where a person would 
donate small amounts money to see car thieves dead, even if his car hadn't 
(yet) been stolen:  If it is essentially certain that such a penalty will 
always exist, it will tend to deter future incidents.  All car owners have a 
motivation to maintain that system.

>Another story: suppose that I negligently caused fire that destroys
>house of, say, Toto. Toto knows that if he sues me, I can arrange him
>murdered for the amount less than the amount of damages.

As he could, you.  

Remember, if your bad actions were publicized, your reputation would suffer. 
 If he's satisfied that you are guilty, and can prove it to others, you'll 
be in trouble to have the information published.

(On the other hand, if nobody knows it was you who were responsible, you 
won't suffer, but that's no worse than the status quo.)


> As a result,
>he refrains from suing me, or (if he is a mean person) pays additional 
>money to have me murdered. A suit would probably be a much better outcome.

A "suit" implies that he needs assistance to get the fact of the obligation 
enforced.  Assuming he has enough proof to win a lawsuit, he has more than 
enough proof to sour everyone else on dealing with you in the future, and 
possibly get them to donate to see you dead.  Do you risk it?


>Another story: suppose that OKSAS hired me to work for her, but then
>our relationships go south and she fires me. Again, her fate is very
>unclear, although I would probably spare her life if it were she. 
>
>The bottom line is, it becomes very hard to do ANYTHING that disappoints 
>at least somebody. That can lead to a lot of inefficiencies.

I predict that agreements will simply change to avoid (or anticipate) such 
disappointments, in order to ensure that neither party feels "taken" if 
things don't work out as planned.  Or, if there is an 
innocent-and-unavoidable breach of the agreement that harms one person, the 
other will be motivated to make it up to the first.  In effect, they'll have 
to find a mutually-agreeable middle ground.



Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com