From: Bill Frantz <frantz@netcom.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 0ca8b34df4f55804b35abd0a70241f39c624ae76f60d7e00e86dd088a13f1438
Message ID: <v03007808af61c44c0915@[207.94.249.140]>
Reply To: <333AF0A6.6C81@sk.sympatico.ca>
UTC Datetime: 1997-03-28 20:48:33 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 12:48:33 -0800 (PST)
From: Bill Frantz <frantz@netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 1997 12:48:33 -0800 (PST)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Microsoft ammunition
In-Reply-To: <333AF0A6.6C81@sk.sympatico.ca>
Message-ID: <v03007808af61c44c0915@[207.94.249.140]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>From Infoworld:
>
> March 24, 1997
>...
> If seamless, safe desktop access to remote files
> on the Internet is the goal, Microsoft is spinning
> its wheels. There is really only one way to
> provide these features without introducing a local
> security risk. You have to eliminate the
> possibility that anything you run can affect your
> local drives. Better still, get rid of your local
> drives.
The author misses the point. Whether your personal files are stored on a
local disk or on a server doesn't matter. What matters is whether random
downloaded code (again, Java or ActiveX doesn't matter) can use your
authority to read/modify those files. The ActiveX model of, "It's signed
by XYZ Corp. Of course it's safe." is so much bullshit.* The Java
approach of running untrusted code in a safe box is better, but doing it by
validating the safety of object code requires trusting a large complex
verifier.
* See Norm Hardy's paper, "The Confused Deputy", which I believe is still
available through the EROS page at the University of Pennsylvania.
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(408)356-8506 | Great caves. We mapped | 16345 Englewood Ave.
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