From: David Lucas <davidlu@sco.COM>
To: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Message Hash: c9fc1c6ebad9ea2097ba976b41e9fbce9ee2341d284c139e7a461b970401d140
Message ID: <3.0.2.32.19970624162104.007bb990@middx.x.co.uk>
Reply To: <199706241351.GAA20823@toad.com>
UTC Datetime: 1997-06-24 15:35:00 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 24 Jun 1997 23:35:00 +0800
From: David Lucas <davidlu@sco.COM>
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 1997 23:35:00 +0800
To: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Subject: Re: Comparing Cryptographic Key Sizes
In-Reply-To: <199706241351.GAA20823@toad.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.2.32.19970624162104.007bb990@middx.x.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
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At 09:52 24/06/97 -6, Peter Trei <trei@process.com> wrote:
>Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes.
<...>
>> About 10 years ago now Michael Wiener made a design for such a DES
>> breaking machine. He estimated it would cost $10,000,000 to build
a
>> machine which would break a 56 bit DES encrypted message a few
hours.
>> His machine was scalable, pay more money, break the key faster,
pay
>> less take longer. The estimate was that could build one with
enough
>> DES key searching units to break it in a day for $1,000,000. That
was
>> 10 years ago. 10 years is a long time in the computer industry.
>> Nowadays you build the machine more cheaply as chip technology has
>> progressed, and computers are much faster per $. Estimates are
around
>> $100,000 to build the machine (neglecting hardware engineers
>> consultancy fees).
>
>Go back and check the numbers - if you don't the journalists will.
>(I don't have this paper to hand either :-( ) The Wiener paper is
>much more recent (93?) , and the cost much lower (I think it was
>about $1M for HW and $500K for development costs, for a 3.5 hour
>machine).
Relevant section of AC2 is Table 7.1 (page 153)
The numbers referred to above are slightly out:
In 1995, $1M would give you a machine that would break 56-bit DES in
an average of 3.5 hours
A $10M machine would break 56-bit DES in an average of 21 minutes
[Double the times for an exhaustive keysearch]
<...>
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
David Lucas - Test Engineer @ SCO Cambridge.
E-mail: davidlu@sco.com
Opinions expressed within this message are my own and do not necessarily
represent those of my employer * I am not a lawyer
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The light at the end of the tunnel is an oncoming train...
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