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1997-07-17 - Re: Verisign gets export approval

Header Data

From: Steve Schear <azur@netcom.com>
To: Lucky Green <adam@homeport.org>
Message Hash: 806d87f400cb5c938efae9c9ed92ad54323beef7f2bf189f1a23303cae80dab4
Message ID: <v03102804aff433a4185d@[10.0.2.15]>
Reply To: <v0300781aaff3f52c25a1@[207.94.249.49]>
UTC Datetime: 1997-07-17 22:06:29 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 18 Jul 1997 06:06:29 +0800

Raw message

From: Steve Schear <azur@netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Jul 1997 06:06:29 +0800
To: Lucky Green <adam@homeport.org>
Subject: Re: Verisign gets export approval
In-Reply-To: <v0300781aaff3f52c25a1@[207.94.249.49]>
Message-ID: <v03102804aff433a4185d@[10.0.2.15]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



At 10:00 AM -0700 7/17/97, Lucky Green wrote:
>At 09:16 AM 7/17/97 -0700, Bill Frantz wrote:
>>It seems to me that someone who has a one year export approved Verisign
>>cert should use it to authenticate a new top-level CA cert which they pass
>>to their customers.  Cut Verisign and their nosy/noisy partner out of the
>>loop.
>
>Only a valid VeriSign Global ID cert (an X.509 v3 cert with a special
>extension) will activate the strong encryption in exportable browsers. This
>is hardcoded into Navigator and Internet Explorer.

That's what patch installers are for ;-)

--Steve

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