From: nospam-seesignature@ceddec.com
To: Ray Arachelian <sunder@brainlink.com>
Message Hash: 51bda0bda72967abaec2fb41e54862e9efeeb7003fe70d1a7e0553b20d547368
Message ID: <97Aug12.123816edt.32258@brickwall.ceddec.com>
Reply To: <Pine.SUN.3.96.970812111223.26326D-100000@beast.brainlink.com>
UTC Datetime: 1997-08-12 18:09:51 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 13 Aug 1997 02:09:51 +0800
From: nospam-seesignature@ceddec.com
Date: Wed, 13 Aug 1997 02:09:51 +0800
To: Ray Arachelian <sunder@brainlink.com>
Subject: Re: Encrypting same data with many keys...
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.96.970812111223.26326D-100000@beast.brainlink.com>
Message-ID: <97Aug12.123816edt.32258@brickwall.ceddec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
On Tue, 12 Aug 1997, Ray Arachelian wrote:
> A known plaintext attack won't help you to break the keys unless you have
> one of the eight keys, but will having many keys that encrypt the same
> data significanltly weaken the security of that tiny chunk of data?
>
> And no, I don't mean, there's N keys so the odds of brute forcing the data
> is now N times easier. Assume we're using 128 bit Blowfish/Idea or
> better, and discarding weak keys. Are there any differential or other
> cryptanalysis methods to use the eight resulting cyphertexts to get at the
> data other than brute forcing it if you don't know any of the keys?
>
> What if instead of using a private key cypher, we used a public key
> cypher? Would that make any difference in attack methods?
The only thing I can think of is if you use something like CFB mode, and
the IV is also the same at the beginning, the first 8 bytes will leave a
hole - I don't remember exactly, but I was burned by exactly this when I
saw 8 bytes of plaintext after resetting the IV in an app that xors some
encrypted blocks of data to do something else.
A PK to encode the conventional key works better since you can do a long
or complex conventional key and other material such as an IV once, and
then bury that several times.
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