From: Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk>
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 1997 07:10:29 +0800
To: nobody@REPLAY.COM
Subject: Re: Equal rights for receivers
In-Reply-To: <199710150815.KAA25357@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: <199710152047.VAA00959@server.test.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




> Remind me again:
> 
> Why was it OK when the SENDER could choose to encrypt to an additional
> key, but it's a threat to the free world if the RECEIVER is allowed to
> request the same thing?

It's a threat to the free world if the RECEIVER is allowed to request
the same thing when PGP Inc also goes ahead and implements an enforcer
to bounce mail failing to meet this `request'.  This is not a
`request', this is an `insistance'.  This is a ready to roll system
which could be used as-is to implement GAK.

It is also potentially dangerous even without the SMTP policy enforcer
because if this functionality (CMR public key extension) is part of
the OpenPGP standard, then conformant OpenPGP implementations are pre
GAK enabled -- when GAK comes in, they know how to send to CMR keys,
and the enforcement can be added later.

Adam
-- 
Now officially an EAR violation...
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`