From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 20:58:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Work the work!
In-Reply-To: <64VH5B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9306020432.AA20624@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul, you of all people don't need to feel slighted when I urge people
to do something, anything, about the wiretap chips.  Therefore, let me
rephrase my exhortation to the list at large.

If you are doing something, continue.  If you are not, start.

The particulars of what one does are not so nearly important to me as
that one does something.  Anyone who understands at least one tenth of
this list understands more than your average reporter.  While I would
like all the details to be perfectly accurate everywhere, this is not
going to happen.  Even if you don't feel like you are an expert, you
are more expert than most.  With the aid of the documents in the ftp
site, and a few hours time, you can become even more expert.

> Is there something going on with the EFF that we should know about?

The EFF is going to be involved with the cryptography issue.  More
than that and I defer to John Gilmore, who is on the EFF board and
this list and who can speak more authoritatively than I.

>I know what you
>mean, however, many of the crypto-warriors which may follow do not. It
>may be a good idea to _now_ place a broad policy statement.

Here is my own very short version of my policy toward the wiretap
chips:

"The government has no right to restrict my use of cryptography in any
way.  They may not forbid me to use whatever ciphers I may like, nor
may they require me to use any that I do not like."

The hypothetical backdoor in clipper is a charlatan's issue by
comparison, as is discussion of how to make a key escrow system
'work.'  Do not be suckered into talking about an issue that is not
important.  If someone want to talk about potential back doors, refuse
to speculate.  The existence of a front door (key escrow) make back
door issues pale in comparison.  

If someone wants to talk about how key escrow works, refuse to
elaborate.  Saying that this particular key escrow system is bad has a
large measure of complicity in saying that escrow systems in general
are OK.  Always argue that this particular key escrow system is bad
because it is a key escrow system, not because it has procedural
flaws.

This right issue is that the government has no right to my private
communications.  Every other issue is the wrong issue and detracts
from this central one.  If we defeat one particular system without
defeating all other possible such systems at the same time, we have
not won at all; we have delayed the time of reckoning.

Trenchantly yours,

Eric